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During the sixth century the Byzantines were engaged in long, protracted wars 
against the Persians. The peace treaties were precarious and violated by both parties. 
Thus, the Byzantines forged allies with people in the east in order to gain an advantage 
in warfare with Persia. The appearance of the Türks as potential allies in 560s was a 
welcomed opportunity for the Byzantines, since they could exploit the Türks’ enmity 
towards the Persians, who had acquired common boundaries after their joint attack 
on the Hephthalite Empire. Despite their coalition, the Türk- Persian relations 
collapsed when the Persians refused to co-operate with them in silk trade, afraid of 
losing the monopoly of it. Consequently, the Türks having under their control the 
northern silk route proposed the Byzantines a silk trade agreement and a political 
alliance regarding their common enemies, namely the Persians.  
The Byzantine-Türk alliance had practical results not only in the Middle East 
but also in the Balkans, against another common enemy, the Avars. The latter 
provoked the Türk enmity not only because they fled away from the Türk yoke but 
also because they dwelt near the western frontiers of the Türk Khanate. On the part 
of the Byzantines, the Avars shattered the balance of power along the northern border 
of the Empire since they subdued the people who lived there and launched 
devastating attacks on the Balkan provinces.  
Thus, the particular Master thesis aims at providing a thorough description, 
explanation and understanding of Byzantium’s relations with the Türks. It focuses on 
analyzing the importance of the Türk tribal confederation (Khanate) in the decision 
making and strategy planning of Constantinople, as regards its stance towards the 
Persian Empire and the Avar Khanate. Another parallel objective of no less significance 
is to explore the economic dimensions of that alignment with regard to the regional 
trade network to the north of the Black Sea not only in the Balkans but also in the 
Middle East, where the key factor in Byzantium’s plans, was Sassanid Persia. 
Additionally, it is examined how the Türk Khanate affected balances, both in the 
Balkan and the Middle Eastern frontier, what influences it exerted on the mortal 
struggle between the Avar Khanate and Byzantium in the Balkans and to what extent 
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it affected the way the last Byzantine-Persian war evolved, given the total collapse of 
the Sassanid Empire and its inability to demonstrate resistance to Arab Muslim armies.  
 
  
vi 
 
 
The main goal of the particular Master thesis is to present and evaluate the 
political and economic repercussions of the period 563-628 on the Balkan and Middle-
Eastern frontiers caused by the Byzantine-Türk relations. In order to achieve the 
particular objectives the research method of the present assignment consists of two 
main approaches. The first one concerns the study and examination of the necessary 
primary sources (mainly Byzantine sources, as there are very few other non-Byzantine 
sources containing information on this particular period and on the subject). Every 
available information in the sources is distilled and classified according to its 
importance on the treatment of the subject. The second parallel – and equally 
important – approach is the research on secondary bibliography that has treated the 
subject (or subjects peripheral to it) so far.  
Despite the fact that the Byzantine- Türk contacts influenced the reactions of 
players both in the Balkan and the Middle East frontier zones of Byzantium, as proven 
by the written sources, literature on Byzantine history of the last decades of the 6th 
century and of the first decades of the 7th century mainly focuses on the empire’s 
relations with the Persians or with the Avars. Also, while there are great works that 
paved the way for the Central Asia studies regarding the ethno-genesis of the Türk 
people and the establishment of their khanate- such as these of P. Golden1 and D. 
Sinor2, the memorable study of Chavannes Documents sur les Tou – Kiue (Turcs) 
occidentaux, recueillis et commentés, suivis des notes additionelles- with the exception 
of few works (papers or monographs), in Greece and abroad, the majority of scholars 
of Byzantine history have not dealt with Byzantine-Türk alliance and its impacts on 
Eurasia. In Greek literature there were not many attempts to survey the Byzantine –
Türk contacts in the pre-Islam era with the exception the joint study of Γ.Κ. Λαμπράκης 
and Φ.Ν.Πάγκαλος3. However, a more thorough research has been done by Στ. 
                                                          
1Eg.  An Introduction to the History of the Turkish Peoples 1992, Khazar Studies 1980, The Turkic Peoples 
and Caucasia 2003 are some of the sources of the present study.  
2 Eg. Inner Asia. History-Civilization-Languages 1969, The Establishment and Disolution of the Türk 
Empire are some indicative titles that are also used extensively in the present study. 
3 Λαμπράκης Γ. Κ. - Πάγκαλος Φ. Ν., Έλληνες και Τούρκοι στον 6ο αιώνα. Πρώτη Ελληνοτουρκική 
επαφή. Ιουστινιανός, Ιουστίνος Β΄, Μπου – μιν Καγκαν (Διλζίβουλος), Αθήνα, 1934. 
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Κορδώσης in his monograph Οι Τούρκοι ανάμεσα στην Κίνα και το Βυζάντιο. Despite 
the scant research data in Greece, he examines in depth the relations of the Türks with 
China and Byzantium, the two sedentary empires located on the two edges of Eurasia 
and the political and economic developments on the particular area due to these 
contacts. Also, the monograph Το Βυζάντιο και οι Άβαροι (Στ’-Θ αι.) by Γ. Καρδαράς 
offers a global view of the Byzantine-Avar relations and conflicts from the sixth to 
ninth century. 
So, based on the aforementioned literature the paper is divided into three 
chapters and an introduction, which includes some preliminary remarks on tribal, 
linguistic and national connotations of the ethnonym Türks and a brief account 
concerning the rise of the Türk khanate. In the first chapter there is a short 
presentation of the most important sources which deal with development of the 
bilateral relations between Byzantium and the Türk Khanate (563-628). The second 
chapter, which is the largest and the most significant, is divided into 10 sub-chapters 
in alignment with the embassies that were exchanged between the Byzantines and 
the Türks and the political background of the sixth and seventh centuries. The third 
chapter presents the political and economic repercussions of the Byzantine-Türk 
alliance on the Balkan and Middle Eastern frontiers of Byzantium. Finally, there is an 
attempt for an overall evaluation of the particular alliance (conclusion). 
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1. Note on the usage of the terms Turk(s), Türk(s), Turkic. 
Like almost every ethnonym, that of the Turks has multiple meanings and 
dimensions. This is largely due to the fact that from its appearance as a tribal name to 
its present form as the nationality of the inhabitants of modern Turkey and as a 
general linguistic appellation of a group of peoples and nations, the term Turks has 
been used in multiple ways by various historiographic traditions and has connoted 
groups of people or groups of languages that were (or are) neither identical nor 
concurrent. This has created multiple layers of historical meanings of the ethnonym, 
some of which are convergent, while others divergent. On top of that, modern 
nationalism, especially as it is propagated in Turkey, tends to lump together these 
multiple meanings, treating them, more or less, as a homogenous material that 
historically has led to modern Turkey (this tendency is called Pan-Turkism). This is 
perfectly understandable from the point of view of politics, since modern Turks – as 
every other nation in the world – project their current unity to the past refusing to see 
the historical differentiations or variations of the multiple meanings of the term Turks 
or that linguistic affinity does not imply national identification (either in history or in 
present time). More than that, such an approach to the multiple meanings the term 
Turks facilitates Turkey’s political aims vis-à-vis other peoples, that belong to the same 
language family, namely the Turkic nations, and has also been used by other Powers 
in modern competition in Eurasia. 
In History (as a science), though, one has to be precise and see through 
national (or nationalistic) narrations and political goals. Over time this principle has 
led to some subtle variations as regards terminology about the Turks and their history, 
in a number of languages. For example, despite the fact that in English the term Turks 
has a double meaning (on one hand it means the inhabitants of modern Turkey and 
on the other it refers to the peoples belonging to the Turkic sub-group of the Altaic 
2 
 
languages group)4, the adjectives Turkish (for the first case) and Turkic (for the second 
case) have been produced and extensively used in bibliography, especially during the 
past few decades.5 Obviously, this reflects the need to discriminate between what 
pertains to modern Turkey and modern Turks and what can be ascribed to a wider, 
non-national category of peoples speaking closely related languages, of which the 
modern Türks are just a branch; in addition, it could signify something that pertains to 
one of the Turkic nations, but not particularly to the Turkish nation.6 Similar semantic 
distinctions have been produced in Russian and Chinese.7 
The initial, historical tribe of the Türks that formed a vast nomadic empire in 
the 6th - 7th century and engaged in diplomatic relations with Byzantium, Persia and 
China lent its name (through complex historical processes8) to a group of peoples 
speaking related languages and to a particular modern nation, namely the one residing 
in modern Turkey. Yet, this does not mean that the Türks of the 6th century are the 
forefathers of every Turkic nation or the spring from which Turkic nations multiplied 
and became populous. After all, there were Turkic tribes and nations (in the strict 
linguistic term) that existed before the appearance of this historical tribe or 
concurrently with them in History and in the sources (and this also applies to the 
linguistic forefathers of modern Turkey – the Oghuz9). It is for these reasons that it 
was decided that the initial tribal name of the Türks be written with a ü-umlaut, to 
distinguish them from the broader linguistic group and from the modern nation and 
to avoid any unnecessary political misunderstandings.  
  
                                                          
4 Britannica World Language Edition. New Practical Standard Dictionary, Funk&Wagnalls, New York, 
1954 for the entry Turk: “Turk noun 1 A native or inhabitant of Turkey; an Ottoman. 2 One of any of the 
peoples speaking any of the Turkic languages, and ranging from the Adriatic to the Sea of Okhotsk: 
believed to be of the same ultimate extraction as the Mongols. 3 Loosely, a Mohammedan. 4 A Turkish 
horse.” 
5 Britannica: Turkish: “adj. 1. Of or pertaining to Turkey or the Turks. 2 Of or pertaining to the Turkic 
subfamily of Ural-Altaic languages, especially to Osmanli. – noun The language of Turkey; Osmanli.” 
Britannica: Turkic: “adj. Pertaining to a subfamily of Ural-Altaic languages, or to any of the peoples 
speaking any of these agglutinative languages”. 
6 Findley2005, 6: “To put in another way, the image of a bus travelling to Turkey facilitates discussion 
of what is Turkish – now conventional scholarly usage in English for the people, language, and culture 
of the Turkish language – but does not include all that is Turkic – the corresponding term applicable to 
all Turks everywhere, including the Turkish Republic”. 
7 See for those Κορδώσης 2010, 62-77. 
8 See for those Kordoses 2012, 29-40. 
9 Κορδώσης 2011, 49-64. 
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2. The rise of the Türk tribe 
The origins of the Türks10 is covered by the mists of History. Their ethno-genetic 
legends are preserved in the Chinese dynastic annals and give contradictory evidence11. 
Nevertheless, many scholars12 believe that the Türks were an independent branch of the 
Hsiung-nu13 with the family name the A-shih-na clan. It is claimed that the Türks with other 
Southern Siberia tribes came into northern China after the fall of the Hsiung-nu Empire (220)14. 
In the course of their migrations they came in conduct with Iranian and Tokharian population, 
which is evident in some remnants of their earliest language15. In the middle of the fifth 
century they became subjects of the Róurán16 who brought them to the Southern Altay region 
where they became the blacksmiths of their overlords17. How or when the process of state 
formation took place is not recorded, but the composite character of the Türk nation is beyond 
any doubt18. The A-shih-na clan (maybe not have been of Türkic origin, as its name depicts) 
had under its rule tribes of different origins, some of whom were speaking Turkic languages 
dialects creating –at least according to some scholars-a common culture19.  
The Türks made their appearance in the mid-sixth century. After putting down a T'ieh-
lê rebellion against their overlords20, their leader, Boumin requested an imperial bride as a 
                                                          
10It is likely that the word türk meant powerful, mighty in the Old Turkic.  In the Chinese sources the 
Türks were called Tujue which according to a folk etymology, denotes “helmet” due to the fact that the 
Altay mountains where the Türks were located looked like a helmet See Golden 2011, 48, Roux 1998, 
69. The Türks in the Orkhon inscriptions were named Kök Türks (Talât 1968, 263-264) which is said to 
mean Celestial or Blue. This is consistent with the cult of heaven, the superior God to whom the 
Shamanists Türks believed at the particular era. See Giraud 1969, 7.  
11 See Sinor 1990, 287-288; Sinor- Klyashtorny 1996: “According to the Chou shu, ‘No doubt the Türks 
are a detached branch of the Hsiung-nu, an opinion taken over verbatim by the Pei-shih. But the Chou 
shu also relates another tradition according to which the Türks ‘originated in the country of So, located 
north of the Hsiung-nu’. Since the location of So cannot be established, the information is of little use 
and simply shows that, according to this ‘other tradition’, the Türks were not a part of the Hsiung-nu 
confederation”. 
12 Findley 2005, 21; Klyashtorny 1994, 445; Parker 1895,177; Golden 1992, 118; Roux 1998, 70  
13 Parker 1895, 177; Roux 1998, 46-47; Erdal 2004, 2. 
14 Golden2011, 44. 
15 The name of the A-shih-na or the personal names of the first Khagans are not Turkic. See Sinor 1990, 
290 and 1996, 325-326. Klyashtorny (1994, 446-447) suggests that the Chinese A-shih-na is the 
transcription of Khotan-Saka âṣṣeina/âššena meaning blue. In the Orkhon inscriptions the people who 
found and inhabited the empire were called Kök Türks meaning blue Türks. Therefore, he claims that it 
is likely that either the Kök is the Turkic translation of A-shih-na or Kök Türks can be translated as the 
Köks and the Türks, which designates that both element came together with the founding of the state. 
16 The origins of Hsiung-nu is a controversial issue since there are scholars who believe that they were 
Proto-Mongols see( Grousset 1970, 104) and others who claim that they were of Türk origins. See Roux 
1998, 47 and Clauson 1960, 122: 
17Sinor 1969, 101. 
18 Sinor 1996, 325. 
19 Golden 1992, 126. 
20 Golden 1992, 127. 
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reward for his services. When the Róurán Khagan21, Anagui haughtily refused to give his 
daughter to his blacksmith slave22, Boumin turned to the Western Wei, one of the states of 
the dismembered Chinese North23, with whom he had already come in contact since 54524. 
The Western Wei dispatched a royal bride to Bumin in order to seal their alliance with the 
Türks against the Róurán who were their common enemy. The Türks empowered due to 
Western Wei alliance took advantage of the Róurán’s internal strife and revolted against them 
(55225). By the mid-550s the Róurán were shattered by the Türks.26 
On the death of Boumin, the government of the newly founded Türk Empire was 
divided between his son, Muhan (553–572) and his brother, Ishtemi (553-576). Muhan ruled 
over the eastern parts of the Empire and had the primacy of the two halves while Ishtemi 
yabghou27 was in charge of the western parts of it. Thus, from the outset the Türk Empire was 
bifocal28. Both rulers extended the frontiers of their state by launching a series of military 
campaigns. In the east they defeated the Kitans and incorporated the Kyrgyz into their realm29. 
In the west the Türks concluded an offensive alliance with the Persians against the 
Hephthalites (557)30 which was sealed by the marriage of the daughter of Ishtemi with 
Khosro31. Then, both allies crushed the Hephthalite state at the same time and divided its 
lands (560)32. The river Amu-Darya became the common border of the two empires33. The 
Türks took the territory of Sogdiana while the Sassanids subjugated the lands to the south of 
Amu-Darya river (Bactria)34. Apart from territorial gains the Türk-Persian alliance was 
beneficial for parties in other ways, too. The Persians managed to get rid of a mighty enemy 
who launched attacks on their eastern provinces, while they could sell large quantities of silk 
to Byzantium without having the Hephthalites as their competitors. The Türks, also, gained 
the control over the Northern silk route through their conquests and increased the possibility 
                                                          
21 For the title of khagan see Grousset 1970, 104, Σαββίδης 2002, 427. 
22 Chavannes 1969, 221-222; Κορδώσης 2012, 74. Zhang Xu-Shuan 1998, 284. 
23 Kyzlacov 1996, 322. 
24 Cahun 1896,42; Κορδώσης 2012, 73 
25 Chavannes 1969, 222; Kyzlacov 1996, 323. 
26Chavannes 1969, 250; Golden 31. Sinor (1996, 326-327 and 1997a, 101) believes that the overthrown 
of the Róuráns’ rule was a result of a lower class’ struggle against the ruling class waged by the Türks 
who were employed as Róuráns’ blacksmiths.  
27 For the title yabghou see Chavannes 1969, 219; Christian 1998, 251. 
28 Sinor 1969, 103; 1990, 298; 1996, 327. 
29 Parker, 1986, 181-182, Escedy1968, 134. 
30 For the Hephthalite-Pesian conflict before the Türk-Persian alliance see Σαββίδης 2006α, 68-70.; 
Κορδώσης 2012, 72.  
31Christensen, 1971 380; Golden 1992, 128-127. 
32 Chavannes 1969, 226; Grousset 1970, 127; Κορδώσης 2012, 83; Sayili 1982, 18; Σαββίδης 2006α, 68-
75. 
33 Chavannes 1969, 222-223. 
34 Harmatta, Litvinsky 1996, 359. 
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of direct contact with the most important silk consumer, Byzantium35. It is possible that these 
conquests reveal the Türk interest in silk trade since Boumin had already tried to established 
relations with China and after the Türk expansion the international commerce was 
stimulated36.  
Nevertheless it was a short –lived alliance. Despite Türks’ efforts to established trade 
relation with the Persians, the latter made clear that they were not willing to let the Türks 
establish commercial footholds in their country and share with them the profits derived from 
silk-trade. Therefore the Türks decided to bypass Persia and established direct links with 
Byzantium which was an inimical enemy of Persia. Consequently, through a frequent exchange 
of delegations, the Türks and the Byzantines were determined to act jointly in order to 
annihilate Persia in military and economic terms. 
                                                          
35 Κορδώσης 2012, 367; Sinor 1969, 104-105. 
36 Beckwith 1993, 178-179. 
6 
 
 
1. Note on the Eastern Roman Sources on the Türk Khanate 
The Eastern Roman Sources that provide the scholar with information on the 
Early Türks can be roughly divided into two categories; historians and chroniclers and 
secular and ecclesiastic historiographers. Another classification which intersects the 
previous one is based on the language in which the sources are written. Those which 
are written in Medieval Greek and those written in other languages of the Eastern 
Roman Empire, such as Syriac or Medieval Armenian. The sources that were more 
frequently used for the particular study are: The history of Menander the Guardsman, 
The History of Theophylact Simocatta, Chronographia of Theophanes Confessor, 
Theophanes Byzantius’account preserved in Myriobiblos, The Third Part of the 
Ecclesiastical History of John Bishop of Ephesus and The History of the Caucasian 
Albanians.  
 
1.1. Medieval Greek sources 
1.1. a. Menander Protector 
Menander’s work called History is preserved fragmented in Excerpta de 
legationibus and de sentetiis of Constantine Porphyrogenitus and in Suda. His work 
begins where the previous historian Agathiae Myrinaei stopped (557/558) up to 582, 
which is the end of the reign of Tiberius I37. His compilation abounds with information 
on nomadic peoples of the western Eursian Steppes, such as the Kotigurs, Otigurs, 
Hephthalites and Türks whom he calls with their contemporary names, avoiding 
classical anachronisms such as Huns or Scythes38. Also, Menander saves information 
on the Byzantines’ relations with the Türks and the Persians as well as some backstage 
insight, a fact which shows that he had access to reports of the people who were 
                                                          
37Καρπόζηλος 1997, 456; Menander 1985, 3. 
38 Καρπόζηλος 1997, 457. 
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protagonists in these affairs39. The language he uses in his work is a mixture of 
scholarly and colloquial medieval Greek and it includes many technical as well as Latin 
terms40. 
 
1.1. b. Theophylactus Simocatta 
Theophylactus Simocatta’s Historia, covers the period of Maurice’s reign (582-
602 μ.Χ.) and continues the work of Menander Protector. There are not known any 
personal details except for he came from Egypt. In his historical account there are two 
topics which prevail: the warfare against the Slavs and the Avars in the Balkans and 
the fight against the Persians on the eastern front41. Despite the fact that his works 
suffers from many weaknesses such as inaccuracy in chronological order, lack of 
coherence in the narration of events, it is important because of the lack of sources 
concerning the particular period of Byzantine history42. Simocatta, as Menander, 
preserves much information regarding the initial stages of the nomadic empire of the 
Türks.  
 
1.1. c. Theophanes Confessor 
His most known work is Chronographia, that is the narration of events from 
the reign of Diocletian to the second year of the reign of Michael I (covering a period 
from 285-813). His work reflects the iconophile point of view and is the most 
important source for the period of iconoclasm43. It also describes the campaigns of 
Emperor Heraclius against the Persians and his alliance with the Khazars, who were a 
Turkic tribe subordinate to the Türks44. Theophanes conveys the information that in 
the year 563 a delegation from the depths of the East, dispatched by the king of 
Kermichíōnes, Askel. These Kermichíōnes, according to Theophanes Byzantius, is the 
Persian rendering of the name of the Türks45. 
                                                          
39 Καρπόζηλος 1997, 457-458. 
40 Καρπόζηλος 1997, 458. 
41 Καρπόζηλος 1997, 478. 
42 Καρπόζηλος 1997, 480-481.  
43 Καρπόζηλος 2002, 117. 
44 For the Byzantine- Khazar rapprochement see Balogh 2005, 187-195. 
45 Theophanes Confessor, 239. 
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1.1. d. Theophanes Byzantius 
There are no biographical information on Theophanes Byzantius. Although his 
work has not survived, Patriarch Photius includes in Myriobiblos an account of 
Theophanes’ work. His history covers the period from period from 565 up to 58246. 
Theophanes is important for a piece of information he conveys, concerning the Persian 
rendering of the name of the Türks. The Türk origin of Kermichiones is verified by the 
fact that Byzantius mentions that the particular tribe sent gifts to emperor Justin in 
order that the latter refuse accepting the fleeing Avars (he misplaces the event in the 
reign of Justin and not Justinian). He also verifies that the know-how of the cultivation 
of silk-warms came from Seres47.  
 
1.2. Medieval Syriac Source 
1.2. a. John of Ephesus. 
 
The bishop of Ephesus was born in Amida of Asia Minor in the beginning of the 
6th century. Despite the fact that he was considered as the representative of the 
Monophysite ecclesiastical fraction views, he was chosen by the emperor Justinian to 
undertake a campaign of conversion among the pagans and heretics still flourishing in 
Asia Minor48.  
His most known work is the Ecclesiastical History, a work which consisted of 3 
parts. Of these, the first one has been totally lost, while the second was preserved 
embedded in the work of Dionysus Tell Mahre (in the 3rd part of his chronicles49). The 
third part of John of Ephesus’s work, which is more important for the Turks was found 
in a monastery in the desert Skete, in Egypt near the border with Libya.  
 John of Ephesus makes a reference to Zemarchus’ delegation to the Türks50. 
However, the most important piece of information he provides the modern reader 
with is that when on 584 the Avars sacked Anchialus, (modern Bulgaria) and the 
                                                          
46 Καρπόζηλος 1997, 452. 
47 Theophanes Byzantius, 1-4,270-271. 
48 Harvey 1990, 29. 
49 John of Ephesus, vi. 
50 John of Ephesus, 45-49, 425-428. 
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emperor was preparing the capital for a long siege, the Avars were forced to retreat 
to Sirmium due to attacks on their rear by the Turks51. According to John of Ephesus 
the Avars were obliged to buy off the disengagement of the Turks by paying 8 
Kentinars of gold (1kentinar=100 litres, 1litre of gold=325 gr of gold) (260 kgr of gold). 
This confirms the information of the other Byzantine sources that the Byzantines had 
concluded a political, financial, military treaty with the Turks that also had affected 
the Balkan front. 
 
1.3. Medieval Armenian Source 
1.3. a. Moise de Calankatouts or Movses Dasxuranci 
 Written in the Medieval Armenian language Movses Kalankatouts or 
Dasxuranci’s52 work, called “The History of the Country of Albania” is a historical 
compilation about Caucasian Albania consisting of three volumes53. The second book 
covers the period between the mid -sixth and the mid- seventh century and narrates 
the Khazar invasions in Northern Armenia54.  
According to Movses, the Khazars entered Aghavanie (southern modern 
Armeina) led by the Khan Dschéboukan himself and his son, and sacked Tchog and 
Barda, the latter being the capital of medieval Albania (Armenia). In the process, the 
Khazars entered Georgia and besieged Tiflis, which was their rallying point with 
Heraclius’ armies55. 
  
                                                          
51 Καρδαράς 2010, 72. 
52 Hacikyan 2002, 17: “The attribution of a single author was ruled out…there are at least two authors, 
one in the seventh century who begun the History and another in the tenth century who completed it.” 
53 Howard-Johnston 2006, 49. 
54 Hacikyan 2002, 170. 
55 Movses Dasxuranci, II.11-12, 81-91. 
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2.1 . The 563 embassy of Kermichíōnes 
(According to Theophanes Byzantius and Theophanes Confessor) 
 
Apart from the alleged Byzantine Embassy to the Türks (553), mentioned in Kül 
Teging Inscription on the occasion of the death of their Khagans Bumin and Ishtemi56, 
Theophanes Confessor refers to the arrival of a Kermichíōnes’ embassy in 563 sent by 
their king Askel at the Byzantine court. Unfortunately, Theophanes Confessor provides 
us with limited information concerning the delegation57. He only mentions the name 
of the people Kermichíōnes and to the place they lived ἔθνους πλησίον τοῦ ὠκεανοῦ, 
which cannot help to locate them precisely in a certain geographical context. As a 
result of that the identification of Kermichíōnes has been a matter of controversy 
among the scholars, since there is no agreement on the origins of these people.  
In the Pahlavi tradition the Hephthalites were called Xyōn (o) and were 
distinguished between the White (spēd) and Red (karmīr) Xyōn58. But a further 
difficulty lies in the fact that the name Xyōn is almost identical with the name of 
Chionites, a tribe probably of Iranian origin that dwelt in Bactria and Transoxania in 
late antiquity. Ammianus Marcellinus makes a reference to them in connection with 
the Sasanian emperor Šāpūr II who spent the winter of 356-57 AD in their territory59. 
Moreover, the same historian mentions that Chionites were serving in the emperor’s 
army60 probably after having been defeated by his forces. They also participated in 
Šāpūr’s siege of the byzantine city of Amida (359) as they were attacked on the eastern 
                                                          
56 There is no solid evidence that the particular embassy took place see Κορδώσης 2004, 437-439 and 
Kordoses 2009, 18, 25-26. 
57 Theophanes Confessor, 239: «τῷ δ' αὐτῷ μηνὶ ἦλθον εἰς Κωνσταντινούπολιν πρέσβεις Ἀσκήλ, τοῦ 
ῥηγὸς Ἑρμηχιόνων, τοῦ ἔσωθεν κειμένου τοῦ τῶν βαρβάρων ἔθνους πλησίον τοῦ ὠκεανοῦ». 
58 Sinor 1990,301. 
59 Ammianus Marcellinus, 16.9.4, 241-242. 
60 Ammianus Marcellinus, 17.5.1, 333. 
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part of the wall61. However, according to Sinor, the Chionites, as they were described 
by Marcellinus, cannot be identified with Hephthalites. It is probable that some of 
their descendants were later integrated in the Hephthalites’ empire62. 
Macartney in his effort to resolve certain issues concerning Byzantine writers’ 
references to Turkic nations of the sixth century claims that Kermichíōnes cannot be 
the Tujue (Türks) since the first Türk embassy came to Constantinople in 568 and the 
Avars had already been negotiating with the Byzantines for a permanent settlement 
inside the empire’s frontier from as early as 558 A.D63. Furthermore, their ruler’s name 
was Ἀσκήλ or according to Corippus64, Scultor, while the Türk Khagan at that time was 
Silzibul or Ishtemi65. In addition, taking into account Theophanes Byzantius who 
describes Kermichíōnes as the Türks, formerly called Massagetae and Menander who 
calls the Tujue Türks formerly called Sakae, he concludes that Kermichíōnes inhabited 
the territories where the Massagetae used to live, namely on the river Jaxartes and 
the lake Aral, while the Tujue lived further east in the homes of the old Sacae66. As a 
result of that he identified Kermichíōnes with the abovementioned Chionites who 
ruled over in the Jaxartes-Aral district67. Furthermore, the same scholar argues that 
Kermichíōnes may also be identified with the Ogurs, who had moved westward in the 
fifth century and they were known to the Persians with their old name “Kermichíōnes” 
while the Türks who subdued them on the Volga region knew them as Ogor68.  
Chavannes believes that the Kermichíōnes were actually the Pseudo-Avars. 
Contrary to other scholars he interprets Theophanes Byzantius69 as followed: although 
Massagetes and Türks are not the same people they inhabited the same territory 
successively70. This could mean that the Kermichíōnes might be the Róurán who were 
the real Avars and preceded the Türks. Thus, as the Varchonites (Pseudo-Avars) had 
                                                          
61 Ammianus Marcellinus, 19.1.7-19.2.1, 473-477. In these paragraphs the historian describes not only 
the siege but also the death of their king’s son and the subsequent funeral ceremonies. 
62 Sinor 1990, 301; Macartney 1944, 271; Κορδώσης 2012, 89. 
63 Macartney 1944, 271. 
64 Corippus 1976, 3. 390-391, 72. 
65 Macartney 1944, 272. 
66 Macartney 1944, 272. 
67 Macartney 1944, 273. 
68 Macartney 1944, 274. 
69 Theophanes Byzantius, 2, 270: “Ὅτι τὰ πρὸς Εὖρον ἄνεμον τοῦ Τανάϊδος Τοῦρκοι νέμονται, οἱ πάλαι 
Μασσαγέται καλούμενοι, οὓς Πέρσαι οἰκείᾳ γλώσσῃ Κερμιχίωνάς φασι.” 
70 Κορδώσης 2012, 90: The aforementioned argument has been questioned. 
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appropriated the name of the real Avars, they had also taken the name of 
Kermichíōnes by which the Persians designated the Róurán, namely the real Avars. 
Therefore, the embassy of Kermichíōnes had been sent by Pseudo-Avars. Moreover, 
he identifies the delegation of Askel with the Avar embassy, which according to 
Menander Protector came at the Byzantine Capital in 562 in order to look over for the 
tribe’s permanent settlement71. Chavannes goes even further as he agrees with de 
Boor when the latter replaces the word βαρβάρων with Ἀβάρων in Theophanes’ 
text72.  
However the identification of the two embassies could not be possible. First of 
all, the Avars defeated by the Türks fled westwards, away from the supremacy of their 
masters and in 557 they reached the territory of the Alans to the north of Caucasus73. 
From there they sent their first delegation to the Byzantine court74 (558). By 562, they 
had advanced to the Lower Danube from where they dispatched the second embassy 
of 562 to Justinian Ι. So, the Avars’ fleeing westwards does not coincide with what 
Theophanes Confessor mentions that the embassy of Kermichíōnes was sent from the 
vicinity of the Ocean, πλησίον τοῦ ὠκεανοῦ75. Moreover, in the case that the Avar 
delegation of 562 was identified with that of 563, Theophanes Confessor would have 
at least associated the delegation of 563 with the first Avar embassy76 of 558. Indeed, 
Theophanes was very descriptive concerning the arrival of the first Avar embassy at 
                                                          
71 Menander, fr. 5.4, 50-53. 
72 Chavannes 1969, 232. 
73 Καρδαράς 2008, 237-238; Καρδαράς 2010, 32; Szádeczky-Kardoss 1990, 206-207.  
74 Καρδαράς 2010, 37; Σαββίδης 2006, 144; Beckwith claims that the Avar embassy of 558 was actually 
Turkic: “ In 558 the first Turkic embassy reached Constantinople, seeking the remaining Avars who had 
not submitted, as well as a trade alliance with the Eastern Roman Empire”. Beckwith 2009,116. 
75 Geographical knowledge had not been developed since the time of Strabo. So, people believed at his 
particular time that land, which was surrounded by the Ocean, was extended to the east up to India 
namely little further from the places where Alexander the great had reached cf. Κορδώσης 2012, 93. 
Moreover the chronicler Priscus, who described the great Eurasian migrations of the fifth century 
mentions that people inhabited the shores of the Ocean were obliged to emigrate on account of 
excessive mists from the Ocean and a great plague of gryphons. Due to this migration the Avars were 
driven from their homes and caused the Sabirs to leave their abodes. The Sabirs in turn expelled the 
Ugors, the Onoghurs and the Saraghurs from their territories between 461 and 465 causing them to 
migrate to the Caucasian and Pontic regions. Priscus, 104; Macartney 1944, 266; Szádeczky-Kardoss 
1990, 206. 
76 Κορδώσης 2012, 89. 
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Constantinople, as the Byzantines flocked to see the Asian visitors with their weird 
appearance77.  
As a result of that, most of the scholars, claim that the delegation of 563 is 
Türk78. Sinor, following Theophanes Byzantius, suggests that the Türks were called 
Kermichíōnes by the Persians possible due to the fact that they had incorporated in 
their empire the Red (karmīr) Hephthalites79. Moreover, the name Askel was 
attributed indifferently to the tribe or the ruler of the tribal group of the Western 
Türks called by the Chinese Nushih-pi, since it was the original form of the name of 
this first tribe of the Turkic confederation80.  In addition, Theophanes Byzantius makes 
clear that the delegation was Türk as he recorded the purpose of the mission to 
convince the Byzantine Emperor not to give a permanent settlement to Avars81, who 
were previously Türk vassals. Therefore, it is likely that the newly formed Türk empire 
aimed at identifying the Byzantine intentions concerning the Avar issue82, which would 
define their future relations.  
Nevertheless, there seems to be some doubt as to when the first Turkic 
delegation was dispatched to Byzantines since Theophanes Confessor and 
Theophanes Byzantius differ. According to the first account the first Türk embassy 
came to Constantinople in the thirty-sixth year of Justinian’s reign while the latter 
claimed in Justin’s time (565-578). As a result of that one of the two historians must 
have been inaccurate on the date of the arrival of the first Turkic envoys. 
 Although Theophanes Byzantius is fragmented and quoted by Photius he gives 
us more information concerning the delegation83. As it was mentioned above Türk 
envoys, the so-called Kermichíōnes in the Persian language, were presented to the 
                                                          
77 Theophanes Confessor, 232:” τῷ δ' αὐτῷ χρόνῳ εἰσῆλθεν ἔθνος ἐν Βυζαντίῳ παράδοξον τῶν 
λεγομένων Ἀβάρων, καὶ πᾶσα ἡ πόλις συνέτρεχεν εἰς τὴν θέαν αὐτῶν, ὡς μηδέποτε ἑωρακότες 
τοιοῦτον ἔθνος. εἶχον γὰρ τὰς κόμας ὄπισθεν μακρὰς πάνυ, δεδεμένας πρανδίοις καὶ πεπλεγμένας, ἡ 
δὲ λοιπὴ φορεσία αὐτῶν ὁμοία τῶν λοιπῶν Οὔννων”. 
78E.g. Frye 2001, 179; Κορδώσης 2012, 88-94; Parker 1986, 439; Sinor,-Klyashtorny 1996, 332; Sinor 
1990, 302. 
79 Sinor 1990, 302. 
80 Sinor 1990, 302. 
81 Theophanes Byzantius, 2, 270:” Καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ τότε δῶρα καὶ πρέσβεις πρὸς βασιλέα Ἰουστῖνον 
ἔστειλαν, δεόμενοι μὴ ὑποδέξασθαι αὐτὸν τοὺς Ἀβάρους. Ὁ δὲ τὰ δῶρα λαβὼν καὶ 
ἀντιφιλοφρονησάμενος ἀπέλυσεν εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα”. 
82 Κορδώσης 2012, 92. 
83 Theophanes Byzantius, 2, 270: “Τοῖς δὲ Ἀβάροις ὕστερον ἐλθοῦσι, καὶ Παννονίαν οἰκῆσαι καὶ εἰρήνης 
τυχεῖν δεομένοις, διὰ τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Τούρκους λόγον καὶ τὰς συνθήκας οὐκ ἐσπείσατο.” 
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emperor Justin with gifts to request not to give asylum to Avars. The Emperor after 
having received the ambassadors and rewarded them with gifts, he let them return to 
their home. As it is known, the first Türk embassy that came to Constantinople during 
Justin’s reign was the one headed by Maniakh in 567. But, despite the fact that 
Menander gives a detailed account of the embassy of 567 and its return, he only lists 
two points as the result of the Byzantine –Türk agreement: the decision to circumvent 
the Sasanians and bring silk over the steppe route to the Byzantine markets and the 
making of Byzantine-Türk alliance against the Persians84. Consequently, there is no 
reference concerning the Byzantine response to the Avar request for land.  
Thereafter, Theophanes mentions that when the Avars came to request for 
peace and Justin’s permission to settle Pannonia, the emperor refused to cede the 
particular land to them due to his agreement with the Türks. Very briefly, the Avars85 
had sent three delegations to the Byzantine court before their permanent settlement 
in Pannonia (567). Consequently, the Avars after their arrival at the land of Alans86 
dispatched an embassy to Byzantines (558) to request alliance87. According to their 
proposal, the Avars would protect the empire’s frontiers from the imminent enemies 
in exchange for gifts, annual pension and fertile lands in which to settle88. Justinian I, 
unwilling to battle, urged the newcomers to make an alliance with Romans and fight 
against their enemies89. He accepted to offer gifts and annual subsidies but he did not 
cede them land.90. Indeed, the Avars acting as foederati responded to the emperor’s 
message and defeated the Onogurs, the Zali and the Sabirs, who were Hunnic tribes91.  
                                                          
84 Frye 1943, 179; Κορδώσης 2012, 138. 
85 Menander, n. 19, 252: “…Theophylactus (VII.8.3-6) insists that the Avars known to the Romans were 
False Avars, being in fact two tribes, the Uar and Chunni (cf. Menander fr. 19.1 where the Turk chief 
refers to them ‘as my slaves Uarchonitae’) who had taken the name of the Avars, formerly the most 
feared people of Scythia. ...”. Καρδαράς 2010, 32-35. 
86 The arrival of the Avars at the land of Alans, north of Caucasus is usually dated to 557/8, while Blockley 
(Menander, n. 19, 253) prefers 559/560. See also Bury 1958, 315; Καρδαράς 2010, 37. 
87 In 557 almost after the coming of the Avars, the king of the Alans Sarus, acting as mediator, had 
notified to the imperial commander of Lazica the desire of the Avar Khagan to enter in to 
communication with the Emperor. Menander, fr.5.1, 48-49, Bury 1958, 305; Obolensky 1971, 48; 
Σαββίδης 2003, 43. 
88 Menander, fr.5.1, 48-49; Obolensky 1971, 48; 
89 Menander, fr.5.2, 50: “whether the Avars prevailed or were defeated both eventualities would be to 
the Romans’ advantage”. 
90 Menander, fr.5.2, 48-51. 
91 Menander, fr.5.2, 50-51 and n. 23, 253; Obolensky 1971, 48. 
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Having subjugated the Antae of Bessarabia and advanced already to the lower 
Danube92, the Avars dispatched a new embassy (562) to restate their request for 
permanent settlement93. While the emperor was planning to settle the tribe on the 
eastern Pannonia94, the Avars were willing to live only in Minor Scythia. Justinian I 
rejected their request to settle there as he was afraid that the Avars would launch 
attacks from Minor Scythia to the rich pasture lands of Thrace95. Since the envoys’ 
demands were not fulfilled they were allowed to leave having received the 
accustomed gifts96. 
At the beginning of Justin II’s reign97 (565) the third Avar delegation was 
dispatched to the Byzantine court, in order to request more money as a tribute in 
exchange for the tribe’s service as guards of the empire’s frontiers. Justin II, 
determined to put a stop to the humiliating policy of buying off the northern 
barbarians, did not retreat to their claims although their speech, both pleading and 
threatening98, intended to intimidate the young emperor to pay the tribute99. The 
Avars, having realized that they would not be given what they had demanded and 
received during Justinian’s reign, they chose to go off to the land of Franks100. 
Therefore, they moved on to Pannonia. There, the Avars allied with the Lombards101, 
                                                          
92 Καρδαράς 2010, 40. 
93 One of the envoys revealed to Justin, the son of Germanus, who was in charge for the Journey of the 
Avar delegation to the capital, that a treachery was intended. Thus, he advised Justinian to detain the 
envoys as long as possible, since the Avars would not attempt to cross the Danube until the envoys had 
departed. See Menander, fr.5.4, 50-53; Bury 1958, Vol. II, 315; Καρδαράς 2010, 41; Κορδώσης 2012, 
139.  
94 Menander, n. 28, 153: “Justinian wanted to settle the Avars in the part of Pannonia II called Bassiana, 
where he choice of Pannonia was advantageous for the Byzantines, because the Avars would threaten 
and be threatened by the Gepids. They themselves wanted the province of Scythia Minor. This would 
have put Thrace at risk”. 
95 Καρδαράς 2010, 41; Obolensky 1971, 48; Κορδώσης 2012, 139. 
96 Justinian also gave secret instruction to Justin to take the arms that they had purchased in 
Constantinople away from the envoys on their return. This act is said to have been the beginning of 
enmity between the Romans and the Avars, but the actual cause was that the envoys had not been 
quickly released. See Menander 1985, 52-53. Bury 1958, 315; Καρδαράς 2010, 42 
97Menander, n. 90, 261: “Justin was crowned emperor on n November 14, 565; According to Corippus 
(In Laud. Iust. 3, 151ff, the Avar envoys were given audience on the seventh day of his reign”.  
98 The style of the speech, threatening and appealing is also common in Corippus. See Corippus, 3, 271-
307ff, 69-70. 
99 Menander, fr.8, 94-97; Καρδαράς 2010, 41 Κορδώσης 2012, 140 Obolensky 1971, 49. 
100 Menander fr.8, 94-97; Καρδαράς 2010, 46; Κορδώσης 2012, 140. 
101 The Lombards were receiving imperial subsidies by Justinian in order to fight the Gepids. 
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subjugated the Gepids and occupied the lands of the defeated in Dacia and Eastern 
Pannonia by 567102.  
To sum up, the three Avar delegations aiming at requesting land for the tribe’s 
settlement took place before the Avar migration to Pannonia. Although both 
emperors, Justinian and Justin II were quite flexible to provide the Avars with gifts and 
annual subsidies, they never consented to grant them land. Thus, the agreement 
between the embassy of Kermichíōnes and the Byzantine court had already been 
compiled since there was no reference to the Avar-Byzantine relations in the 
subsequent embassy of Maniakh (567/568), on the part of the Türks103. So, the 
delegation of Kermichíōnes cannot be identified with the one headed by Maniakh 
whose objectives concerned the economic and political annihilation of Persia104. 
Furthermore, Theophanes Byzantius specifies the arrival of the Türk envoys in terms 
of time before the Avar movement to Pannonia. Consequently, the Türk envoys must 
have been sent before 567105.  
In addition, when the Türk Khagan, Silzibul106 heard of the flight of the Avars 
and the damages they caused by ravaging the territory of the Türks at their departure, 
                                                          
102 The Avars took advantage of the Lombard migration to Italy (568), and occupied the territory vacated 
by the latter. Therefore, they became the masters of the entire plain of present-day Hungary except for 
the area of Sirmium, which the Byzantines had already conquered under the leadership of the general 
Bonus. Having established a powerful empire in Central Europe, the Avars became a constant threat for 
the Byzantines as they launched attacks to the empire during three next three decades. See Browning 
1979, 207; Golden 1990, 260; Fryer 2001, 179; Καρδαράς 2010, 47-48; Κορδώσης 2012, 140-141; 
Obolensky 1971, 49-50. 
103 Κορδώσης 2012, 141-142. 
104 Frye 2001, 179. 
105 Κορδώσης 2012, 140. 
106 For the name Silzibul see Moravcsik 1983, 275-276. The name of the Türk Khagan occurs in three 
forms as Dizabul, Dilzibul and Silzibul in the Byzantine historiography. From these scripts the last one is 
to be preferred since the great Muslim Chronicler, Tabari (died 923-924) names him as Sindjibu-Khagan, 
see Bury 1897, 418; Chavannes (1900, 227-228).claims that the name Silzibul derives from the proper 
name Sin and the Türk title yabghou Also, there are different accounts concerning the identification of 
Silzibul. While the Türk khagan is known as Ishtemi among his clan (see Σαββίδης 2006, 187) there are 
scholars who do not identify Ishtemi with Silzibul. Sinor (1990, 303)argues that there is no evidence to 
believe that Ishtemi and Silzibul are the same person apart from the fact that Ishtemi was in charge of 
the Western Frontier Region of the Türk Empire,. Frye (2001, 179) considers that while Ishtemi was one 
of the ruler of the Western Türks, Silzibul was another leader, who dealt with the Byzantines. Ιn spite 
of Menander’s words that there were four leaders among the Türks but the supreme authority over the 
whole state rested with Silzibul the latter cannot be identified with Muhan. According to Sinor (1990, 
303) it is probable that Maniakh simply exaggerated and boasted of the power of his Khagan and 
consequently of the significance of his mission). See also Κορδώσης 2012, n. 5, 96. 
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he declared boastfully that since the Avars were not birds or fish to take refuge in the 
air or in the depths of the sea respectively but they had to travel the earth, he would 
crushed them when he finished the war with the Ephthalites107. It is likely that Silzibul 
became extremely irritated when he learnt that the Avars moved to lower Danube 
(561-562) and sent the delegation of Kermichíōnes to convince the emperor not give 
an asylum to his previous vassals108.Thus, the embassy of 563 could be identified with 
the embassy that Theophanes Byzantius mentions109 on condition that the latter 
might have been mistaken with regard to the date of its arrival, namely during Justin 
II’s reign. 
To conclude, it is likely that the Türks were informed that the Avars had already 
advanced at Lower Danube (561-562) and they were negotiating with the Byzantines. 
As a result of that, Silzibul sent the delegation of 563 in order to claim from the 
Byzantines not to respond to the Avar’ request for ceding them land to settle. Ιt is also 
probable that the embassy was dispatched by a certain Türk ruler under the 
instructions of Silzibul whose tribe inhabited the territory of the ancient 
Massagetae110. Consequently, since the Kermichíōnes were the Türks, according to 
Theophanes Byzantius, and were sent before 567, the embassy of Theophanes 
Confessor is identified with the embassy of Theophanes Byzantius despite the fact that 
there is a discrepancy concerning the date of the date of its arrival into the Byzantine 
court111. 
 
2.2 . The 567 Türk embassy to Byzantium 
(According to Menander Protector) 
Most of the information on the embassy of 567 is drawn from Menander 
Protector, who is the major source for the diplomatic and military history of the reigns 
of Justin II and Tiberius112. The 567 Türk embassy113 to the Byzantines was a result of 
                                                          
 
107 Menander, fr.4.2, 44-47, Macartney 1944, 267. 
108 Κορδώσης 2012, 141. 
109 Κορδώσης 2012, 143. 
110 Κορδώσης 2012, 143. 
111 Κορδώσης 2012, 143. 
112 Baldwin 1978, 101. 
113 Chavannes 1900, 235; Σαββίδης 1996, 61-62. 
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the disruption of the diplomatic contacts between the Türks and the Persians114 whose 
empires became adjacent, in Central Asia (mod. Afghanistan), after the destruction 
and the partition of the Hephthalite Empire115. 
The Sogdians116, who had previously been subjects of the Hephthalites, at that 
particular time were under the Türk supremacy. Since they needed to find markets for 
their silk products, they had to obtain first their rulers’ permission in order to sell silk 
in Persia. So, Silzibul consented to send an embassy to the Persians in order to 
negotiate their engagement in the silk trade with them. Although the delegation was 
travelling under the Türk auspices, it was in fact a Sogdian mission headed by Maniakh, 
who was their leader117. When the latter requested from king Khosro (531-579) to 
provide his permission for the Sogdian merchants to sell raw silk in Persian markets 
without any hindrance118, the Persian ruler, unwilling to grant them free access, put 
off his reply. Indeed, the Persian king found himself in a predicament as he was afraid 
not only of an imminent Türk expansion southwards, into Persian territories, but also 
of a possible loss of the benefits resulting from Sassanid monopoly over silk transit, 
since the Türks appeared to be claiming a share in silk trade profits119.  
Finally, acting on Katulph’s120 advice, Khosro bought the large quantities of silk 
that the Sogdians brought with them in a fair price, burning them, though, right 
                                                          
114 The alliance between Silzibul, who ruled the western part of the Türk realm and the Sassanid ruler 
Khosro was concluded in 557 and sealed with the marriage of the king Khosro with the daughter of the 
Türk Khagan. See Κορδώσης 2012, 82. Although the Türks and Sassanids agreed to crush the Hepthalites 
and divide their land, this was a short-lived alliance for the two empires had conflict of interests as both 
of them were seeking to control the western end of the silk route. See Golden 1992, 128; Roux 1998, 
71. 
115The cooperation between the Türks and the Sassanids resulted in the destruction and partition of 
the Hephthalite Kingdom that took place around 560. Therefore, Türks and Sassanids acquired common 
frontiers, which followed the Oxus River. See Menander 1985, 252; Sinor 1977, 430. 
116  Vaissière 2005, 199: “The Sogdians were the main merchants of the Türk steppe. They played the 
role of counsellors to the nomads and had a strong foothold in the economic and political life of the 
successive Türk qaghanates which controlled the steppe from Mongolia between the middle of the 6th 
and the middle of the 8th centuries”. See also Menander1985, 110-111; Erdemir 2004, 426; Sinor 1977, 
431.  
117 Menander, fr.10.1, 114-115; Sinor 1990, 301. 
118Menander, fr.10.1, 1985, 112-13. “ἐδέοντο τῆς μετάξης πέρι, ὅπως ἄνευ τινὸς κωλύμης ἀυτοῖς 
προέλθοι ἐπ' αὐτῇ τὰ τῆς ἐμπορίας”.  
119 Menander, n. 115, 262; Sinor 1977, 432. 
120 Katulph first appears in the fourth fragment of Menander’s History as an advisor of the Hephthalite 
ruler. But due to the fact that he was treated unjustly, Katulph reappears as an advisor then of the 
Persian king Khosro, (Menander, fr.10.1, 112-113). Menander, probably because Katulph’s life had 
caught his interest, provides us with some more information to justify the latter’s desertion firstly to 
the Türks – for his wife had been raped by the Hephthalite ruler – and then to the Sassanids. According 
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afterwards without any hesitation in front of the envoys’ eyes, making it clear that the 
Persians were determined to preserve silk transit and trade through the main land and 
sea routes under their control121. Despite the fact that the silk was burnt and the 
Sogdians returned empty-handed, the Türk khagan, Silzibul was not disappointed 
since he was persistent in restoring the relations between the Persian and his own 
empire. Thus, a second Türk delegation was dispatched to the Persians but it was utter 
failure in every aspect. King Khosro taking the advice of Katulph and his other 
consultants, rejected the offer of the Türks due “to the untrustworthy nature of the 
Scythians122”. It seems that either the Türks were not complying with the terms of the 
agreement in which the two empires concluded when they had decided to subjugate 
and divide the Hephhthalite state or there was no reason for the agreement to be kept 
since it was unprofitable, at least for the Persians123.  
Taking this into account (and performing an act of utter hostility), king Khosro 
decided, then, to poison some of the Türk envoys124 to prevent any future delegations 
from coming to Persia and, henceforth, to break off the Türk-Persian diplomatic 
relations125. While the official Persian explanation for the death of the envoys was the 
dryness of the Persian weather, which proved ‘fatal’ to them, the Türk Khagan 
recognized that the envoys were actually killed by treachery126. Due to the fact that 
the Persians violated the time- honored law of international diplomatic immunity, the 
relations between the Persians and the Türks became hostile127. Having failed in the 
negotiations with the Sassanid Empire, the Türks turned to cultivate friendly relations 
with Byzantium influenced by their vassals the Sogdians. 
                                                          
to Felföldi (2001, 193-194) Katulph was a prominent person because he was not only aware of 
Hephthalite and Türk conditions, but he was also an expert in silk trade. Indeed, when he became an 
advisor of the Sassanid ruler he played a very significant role in Persian politics. 
121 Menander, fr.10.1, 112-113. 
122 Menander, fr.10.1, 112-113 and n. 116, 262; “The ‘Scythians’ is not used as a synonym for ‘Türks’ 
but refers in general to all the nomadic inhabitants of Scythia. The view that nomads were 
untrustworthy was shared with the Romans”. 
123 Κορδώσης 2012, 97. 
124 Beckwith 2009, 116. 
125 Menander, fr.10.1, 112-113; Κορδώσης 2012, 96; Λαμπράκης- Πάγκαλος 1934, 143; Sinor, 1977, 
432; Sinor 1990, 302. 
126Menander, fr.10.1, 114-115. 
127 Beckwith 2009, 116; Menander, fr.10.1, 114-115; Κορδώσης 2012, 97. 
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Thus, Silzibul consented to Maniakh’s proposal to dispatch a delegation to the 
Byzantines since they made more use of it (silk) than other people128. Along with the 
embassy, which was led by Maniakh, the Türk khagan sent raw silk as present and a 
letter written in Scythian language γράμμα τὸ Σκυθικὸν129. Despite the fact that the 
envoys had traversed many lands, mountainous areas and rivers130 the route was quite 
safe since the Türks had under their control the territory extending to the north of the 
Black Sea131. The delegation finally reached Byzantium through the land of the Alans. 
 After their splendid reception132 and the interpretation of the Scythian letter, 
the Emperor willingly gave an audience to the envoys. Justin II took advantage of their 
presence and asked information about the leadership of the Türks and their 
location133 . Maniakh, then, replied that the Türk realm consisted of four principalities 
but he attributed the supremacy over the whole realm to Silzibul134 . The envoys, also, 
mentioned the Hephthalites, whom the Türks subjugated and made their tributary. 
Justin, in turn required to learn whether the Türks had made all the power of the 
Hephthalites subject to them. When the ambassadors answered positively, the 
Emperor asked again if the Hephthalites lived in cities or villages135. The envoys 
                                                          
128 Menander fr.10.1, 114. 
129 Menander, fr.10.1, 114 and n. 119, 263. “… Scythian is used in a loose way of the languages of Central 
Asia…One of the languages of the settled peoples such as Sogdian is more likely”. Vailhé (1909, 210) 
claims that the letter was written in alphabet paléo-turc”. Cahun (1896, 212), also, argues that the 
Scythian characters of the letter belonged to an Old Turkic script and considers remarkable the fact that 
the Byzantines had an interpreter, who could translate the particular letter. However, the 
aforementioned views come in contrast with the Bugut inscription, dated to the last quarter of the sixth 
century, which is written in Sogdian script, despite the fact that the language is Turkic. See Άμαντος 
1940, 63; Kljaštornyj- Livšic 1972, 82; Erdal 2004, 1-4; Κορδώσης 2012, 99.  
130 Menander, fr.10.1, 114-115. 
131 Talât 1968, 263: “Over the human beings, my ancestors Bumin Kagan and Istämi Kagan became 
rulers….Having marched with the armies they conquered all the peoples in the four quarters of the 
world and subjugates them. They made the proud enemies bow and powerful ones kneel”. 
132 Λαμπράκης- Πάγκαλος 1934, 147-152. 
133Menander, fr.10.1, 114-115. 
134 Bury 1897, 419-420: There were at this time two distinct and independent Turkish realms: the 
northern realm of Silzibul, who lived in the northern Golden Mountain, and the southern realm of 
Muhan, who lived in the southern Golden Mountain. Silzibul was the senior khagan over the four 
principalities that comprised the western Türk realm. See also Chavannes 1900, 235; Cahun 1896, 112-
113.  
135 According to Procopius History of the Wars I.3.2-5 the land of the Hephthalites lies immediately to 
the north of Persia. The Hephthalites are not nomads like the other Hunnic tribes, since they have been 
established in land. They are ruled by a king and possess lawful constitution. The Greek historian refers 
to one of their cities called Gorgo located over against the Persian frontier, which is an indication that 
that the Hephthalites had sedentary civilization. Moreover, Theophanes Byzantius, (3, 270), mentions 
that the Hephthalites became masters of the cities and harbors, which were formerly owned by the 
Persians after the latter’s defeat. However, according to Enoki (1959, 10) in the Chinese sources there 
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assured the Emperor that the Hephthalites used to live in cities, which all of them were 
conquered by the Türks136. 
Taking in to account the dialogue as described above, Justin II’s questions 
concerned not only the Türk people but also their vassals. Actually, the Emperor 
insisted on learning about the fate of the Hephthalites because it seemed rather 
unconvincing the fact that the dominant for more than a century in Central Asia 
Hephthalite Empire had been subjugated in such a short period of time by the Türks137. 
Furthermore, it is possible that Justin II was also exploring the Persian claim, which 
came in contrast with the aforementioned answers of the Türk envoys138. More 
specifically, during the negotiations of 561 for peace the Persian envoy Zikh began to 
boast and exalt king Khosro by saying that his king was invincible and among the other 
victories he had also destroyed the power of the Hephthalites139. As a result of that, it 
seems that the Byzantine Emperor wished to be informed about the recent 
developments in Central Asia as best as possible.  
Besides the Hephthalites, Justin II showed interest in knowing about the 
Avars140, who had coercively requested to become foederati (558) and caused troubles 
to the Byzantine Empire. Therefore, he inquired about the number of the Avars that 
had managed to flee from the Türk rule and whether there wereb   any of them subject 
                                                          
are references on the nomadic character of the Hephthalites since they had neither cities and towns 
nor fixed residence of their king. On the contrary, they lived in tents and moved to cooler areas in 
summer and warm regions in winter in pursuit of water and pasture lands. Litvinsky (1996, 148) in order 
to explain these different accounts argues that the Hephthalites were originally nomadic or semi-
nomadic but later, after conquering vast regions with towns and fortresses, they began to settle in 
towns. 
136 Menander, fr.10.1, 114-115. 
137 Κορδώσης 2012, 100-101. 
138Menander, n.121, 263. 
139 Menander, fr. 6.1, 64-65. 
140 Szádeczky- Kardoss (1990, 206) claims that Priscus is the first to mention the name of the Avars when 
he referred to Eurasian migrations about 463 A.D. As it stated above, these people caused the Sabirs to 
leave from their dwellings and triggered successive migrations of oghuric nations, who settled to 
Caucasian and Pontic regions. However, it cannot be decided whether Menander refers to the real 
Avars that Priscus describes or to the so-called Peudo-Avars, who showed up nearly one century later 
in the region of the Black Sea. Menander, later on, he uses the ethnonym Varchonitae to denote the 
Avars (ἐδήλουν δε τους Ἀβάρους), the Türks’ slaves “who fled their masters, (Menander, fr.19.1, 174-
175). According to Theophylactus Simocatta (VII.7.8, 259) the Pseudo-Avars had appropriated the Avar 
name in order to be considered awesome by people who came in contact with them. The same historian 
adds that their real name was Varchonitae, a compound word that denotes the origins of Pseudo-Avars, 
the people who originated from the fusion of two Oghuric tribes, the Var and the Chunni. As a result of 
that, the Avars of Menander may or may not be associated with the Varchonitae, who fled to the West. 
See also Καρδαράς 2010, 32-35; Κορδώσης, 2012, 103. 
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to the Türks141. The ambassadors replied that while there still were Avars under their 
dominion, twenty thousand warriors with their families had fled westwards, away 
from their supremacy142. After enumerating the tribes subject to the Türks143, the 
delegation requested from the Emperor εἰρήνην τε ξυνεστάναι καὶ ὁμαιχμίαν 
'Ρωμαίοις τε καὶ Τούρκοις144. They also stated that they would willingly fight against 
the enemies of the Byzantine Empire. Indeed, in order to show their honest intentions, 
they sealed what they had said with great oaths145.  
Since Byzantines and Türks shared common interests, in Menander’s words 
they became friends146 and entered into an alliance with each other. The alliance was 
to be beneficial for both sides in economic and political terms. Indeed, the Sogdians 
identified that the Byzantine empire was the principal western center of silk 
consumption to which the Türks jointly with them could sell the Chinese surplus of silk 
and make huge profits147. Also, apart from having access to the largest market, the 
Türks were able to circumvent the Sassanids by transferring their products through 
the northern Silk Road148 which was under their control after their expansion.  
 On the part of the Byzantines, the Türk proposal was a unique opportunity to 
break the Persian monopoly of silk trade since the latter levied great taxes on the 
goods and regulated the prices and the quantities of the valuable material that were 
imported to Byzantium149. So, despite the fact that Justin II, probably anxious to secure 
most advantageous terms, showed to the Türk embassy the silk warm breeding, he 
was willing to conclude a Byzantine-Türk alliance seeing that silk production was at its 
first steps150. 
                                                          
141Menander, fr.10.1, 114-117.  
142 Menander, fr.10.1, 116-117; Szádeczky-Kardoss 1990, 207. 
143 Theophylactus Simocatta in his history (VII .7.8, 258) mentions peoples subject to Türks such as the 
Μουκρί/BükliBükli to which the Avars fled or the Ἀβδελοὶ, whom he identifies with the Hephthalites. 
144 Menander, fr.10.1, 116-117.  
145 Menander, fr.10.1, 116-117. 
146 Menander, fr.10.1, 116-117. 
147 Beckwith 2009, 116; Menander, fr.10.1, 114-115; Λαμπράκης-Πάγκαλος 1934, 143; Sinor, 1977, 432; 
Sinor 1990, 302; Vaissière 2005, 234-235.  
148 For the northern Silk Route See Zhang Xu-Shan 1998b, 126-131. 
149 Bosworth 2006, xxvii; Κορδώσης 299, 170 
150 Sinor 1969, 105. 
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The alliance was not confined only to economic issues. It was also an offensive 
and defensive alliance151 against the mutual enemies of both empires. The two allies 
aimed at placing Persia in the crossfire. On the one hand the Türks intended to exert 
their authority over the Persian lands in order to take under their control parts of the 
central Silk Road and exploit the already existing transport facilities instead of 
establishing new ones along the deserts of the northern Silk route. On the other the 
Byzantines taking advantage of the Türk enmity acquired a new, faithful ally in their 
protracted wars against the Persians. The recruit of potential allies was necessary for 
the Byzantines in order to preserve the Empire’s boundaries152. Since the Byzantines 
had not inexhaustible sources to allocate along the borders, the proposed alliance 
with the Türks would secure the eastern frontiers from imminent Persian invasions 
and provide Justin with the opportunity to protect better the empire’s western 
frontiers at the particular moment153 As a result of that Maniakh’s mission marked the 
official beginning of the Byzantine-Türk diplomatic exchanges that were carried on by 
the dispatch of the Byzantine delegation led by Zemarchus154.  
 
2.3. The 568 Byzantine Embassy to the Türks 
(According to Menander Protector) 
 
Justin II, thinking of the promising prospects of a Byzantine -Türk alliance due 
to political and economic reasons, concluded to send a delegation to the Türks. 
Therefore, he ordered Zemarchus155 the Cilician, who was at that time the magister 
militum per Orientem156, to accompany Maniakh on his way back. According to 
                                                          
151 Byzantium’s struggle to preserve its boundaries was the primary objective of Byzantine Diplomacy 
which Obolensky named as defensive imperialism. 
152 Byzantium’s struggle to preserve its boundaries was the primary objective of Byzantine Diplomacy 
which Obolensky named as defensive imperialism. 
153 Erdemir 2004, 429.  
154 Kordoses 2011, 297. 
155 The data on Zemarchus personality and life are fragmentary. According to Dobrovits (2011, 384) he 
was a Senator and he might be identical with Zemarchus, who held the title Perfect of Rome, namely 
Constantinople before 560. At the end of 560 he suppressed the revolt in Antioch as comes Orientis, 
see Feissel 1986, 126. He was recalled to Constantinople and by the year 562 he served as curator at 
Πλακιδίας, the palace that was erected by the daughter of Theodosius I, see Cameron-Cameron (1996, 
9). Greatrex claims (1997, 71) that in 565 he was removed from the prefecture of Constantinople and 
sent back to East. 
156 Menander, fr.10.2, 116: “ὃς τῶν πρὸς ἕω πόλεων τηνικαῦτα ὑπῆρχε στρατηγὸς.” 
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Menander, they set out on their journey in August 568157, (namely in less than a year 
from the arrival of the Türk embassy) and returned the following year, while John of 
Ephesus mistakenly dates the envoys’ departure to the seventh year of Justin II’s reign. 
The Journey was completed after πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδὸν158, when they arrived at the 
territories of the Sogdians. The Türk and the Byzantine envoys did not follow the easier 
route via Crimea and the Pontic- Caspian steppes. In fact, this particular route had not 
been used until 576, when the embassy of Valentinus took this way via Sinope and 
Cherson159. So, they used the same itinerary that Maniakh and his companions took in 
order to come to the lands of the Byzantines160.  
After dismounting from their horses the Byzantine embassy were met by 
certain Türks, who were sent deliberately to offer some iron for sale. The purpose of 
this awkward act was to demonstrate that their land produced more iron than they 
needed161. Τhis particular scene shows that there was an organized propaganda on 
the part of the Türk nomadic empire, that aimed at deceiving the ambassadors of a 
foreign state. In that era the deceit of the enemy was a common technique used as 
regards access routes to imperial lands162. Zemarchus for instance, when he returns 
back home, tries to mislead some Persians by sending them from other routes. In 
addition, Turxanthus accuses the Byzantines of hiding deliberately from the Türks the 
more comfortable way to their country, via Crimea and the western shores of the Black 
Sea.  
Before being presented to Silzibul, Zemarchus and his retinue had gone 
through a certain Shamanistic ritual of purification by fire163. Therefore, some other 
people from the same tribe appeared to the Byzantine delegation announcing 
                                                          
157Chavannes 1900, 237; Menander 1985, 116-117.  
158 Menander, fr.10.3, 116-117; cf. John of Ephesus (VI.23, 425) states that the Journey lasted for one 
year. 
159 Menander, fr.19.1, 170-173. 
160 Dobrovits (2011, 385) claims that the ambassadors did not use the way through the Crimea and 
Pontic steppes because it was unsafe due to the Avars. In fact, the Pontic steppes came into Türks’ 
hands between 576 and 579. Moreover, at that particular era the Sabirs were still allies of the Persians 
against the Türks.   
161 Menander, fr.10.3, 116-119. The Türk became blacksmiths when they were under the yoke of the 
Róurán. See Sinor 1969, 101; Chavannes 1900, 235.  
162 Κορδώσης 2012, 105.  
163 Dawson (2005, 12) claims that exorcism was a common practice among the tribes of Central Asia. 
According to Plano Caripini’s narration Michael, Duke of Chernikov, when he visited the Tartar khan 
Batu in 1246, he passed between two fires.  
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themselves as exorcists of the evil omens. Menander describes quite vividly the ritual 
of purification during which the evil averters used fire, made noise with bells and 
drums, chanted in Scythian tongue and raged about like maniacs in order to repel the 
evil spirits. After chasing the evil beings, they made Zemarchus pass through the 
fire164. After these performances the envoys were driven to Silzibul. 
The meeting between the Türk khagan and Zemarchus took place on a 
mountain called Ektag165, or Golden Mountain in Greek166. However, when Menander 
refers to the Valentinus’ embassy (576) calls the same mountain Ektel, which also 
means Golden167. Moreover, Theophylactus Simocatta gives additional information 
concerning the location and the appellation of the mountain. It is 400 miles far away 
from the mountain Ἰκάρ and it is named Golden (Χρυσοῦν) due the abundance of the 
fruit produced and the animals that were fed on it. He also states that the Golden 
Mountain is granted to the most prevalent Khagan168. The location of the mountain 
Ektag has raised much discussion. In any case it is a region of Central Asia situated 
either in Chinese Turkestan or in Kazakhstan169.  
 Silzibul received the Byzantine delegation in the way of traditional nomadic 
ruler. He was in a tent, seated on a golden throne with two wheels, which could be 
drawn by one horse, when deemed necessary170. After greeting the Türk Khagan the 
envoys laid presents before him. Zemarchus addressed Silzibul as the ruler of so many 
people, while he introduced his own master as an emperor171. Then, the Byzantine 
embassy wished the Türk Khagan, who was considered friend by the Romans, felicious 
and kind luck and a victorious glorious reign. In addition, Zemarchus confirmed the 
Byzantine-Türk friendship by stating that the Byzantines would be friends not only 
                                                          
164 Menander, fr.10.3, 118-119. 
165 For Ektag/Ektel see Moravcsik 1958, 122. 
166 Menander, fr.10.3, 118-119:“ἵνα ὁ Χαγάνος αὐτὸς ἦν, ἐν ὄρει τινὶ λεγομένῳ Ἐκτάγ, ὡς ἄν εἴποι 
χρυσοῦν ὄρος Ἕλλην ἀνήρ.”  
167 Menander, fr.19.1, 178-179. 
168 Theophylactus Simocatta, VII. 8. 11-13, 260. 
169 Klaproth (1826, 117) and Bury (1897, 418) claim that Silzibul’s seat was somewhere in the Altai 
ranges, whose name meant Golden while Chavannes (1900, 235-237) identifies the mountain Ektag 
with mount A-kie-tien (White mountain in Chinese), which is to the south of Koutcha by the river 
Tekes. For the location of the mountain see Cahun 1896, 4; Menander, n. 129, 269; Grousset 1970, 128; 
Κορδώσης 2012, 107; Dobrovits 2011, 387. 
170 Menander, fr.10.3, 118-119. 
171 Menander, fr.10.3, 118-119. 
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towards the Türks but also towards their subjects. After Zemarchus’ polite speech, 
Silzibul replied in like manner172. Taking into account Menander’s words, referring to 
the last Byzantine ambassador to the Turks, Valentine, when he asked the Türk ruler 
Turxantus to reconfirm the friendship and the earlier treaty between the Romans and 
the Turks, which Silzibul and the emperor Justin II had made when Zemarchus first 
came there173, one may realize the importance of Zemarchus’ visit during which the 
foundation of the Byzantine-Türk alliance were established174. Then, they were called 
to feast and passed the whole day enjoying themselves. 
 Silzibul granted two other audiences to the Byzantine delegation in different 
dwellings. Menander uses different expressions to denote the Türk lodgings, i.e. 
σκηνῆς, καλύβη, διαίτῃ175, which indicated the nomadic way of living that was 
characterized by mobile dwelling. Despite the lack of permanent residence, the tents 
were lavishly furnished with silk, gold and silver. There were silken hangings, golden 
urns, pitchers, silver utensils and other precious objects, which were not only pieces 
of art but they could also be converted into money176. Moreover, there were statues 
which were typical in Buddhism177. The Chinese influence was evident in the sweet 
wine that the dinner guests were offered to drink, probably made of rice178.   
 While the Byzantine delegation was enjoying the Türk hospitality, Silzibul 
decided that Zemarchus with twenty people of his retinue should accompany the 
Khagan as he was marching against the Persians179.The particular campaign may be 
identified with the military expedition that was launched against the Sassanids (569–
570) in which the Türks conquered the territory of the former Hephthalite kingdom 
belonging to Persia180. The rest of the Romans were sent back to the land of 
                                                          
172 Menander, fr.10.3, 118-119. 
173 Menander, fr.19.1, 172-173. 
174 Kordoses 2011, 297. 
175 Menander 1985, 120. 
176 Chavannes 1900, 238. 
177 Dobrovits 2011, 389. “Such statues are usually unknown in Shamanism but are very typical in 
Buddhism. Buddhism, later rejected by the second Turkic Empire was at the highest point of its 
influence at that time amongst the Eastern Turks”. 
178 Menander, n. 131 264; Dobrovits 2011, 389.  
179 Menander, fr.10.3, 120-121. 
180 Dickens 2004, 55; Harmatta –Litvinsky 1996, 360; Kordoses 2011, 297-298; Κορδώσης 2012, 115. 
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Kholiatae181 to await the return of Zemarchus. Before they moved on, Silzibul honored 
the Byzantine ambassadors with gifts and Zemarchus was given as a present, a 
handmaiden and a war- captive from the people called Kherkhir182. Then, the 
Byzantine delegation followed the Türk khagan to Talas, which might have been his 
winter residence.  
 When they encamped in Talas183, Silzibul received another delegation 
dispatched by the Persian king, whom he invited together with the Byzantines to dine 
with him. During the dinner Silzibul treated the Byzantines with greater esteem than 
the Persians since they had been seated in a more distinguished place at the table. 
Moreover, the Persian envoys had to endure the Türk khagan’s reproaches, who 
emphasized on the injuries he had received at their hands and told them that on this 
account he was going to attack them. Finally, while the accusations were heaped, the 
Persian envoys argued back refuting Silzibul’s charges and using intemperate 
expressions regardless of the etiquette that imposes silence at the feasts. Under these 
circumstances the negotiations came into an end and the Türk khagan prepared for a 
war against the Persians184.  
                                                          
181 Menander has three spellings of the name Kholiatai, (see also Moravcsik 1958, 345), all of them in 
plural and in genitive case: Χολιατῶν (10, 3) Χοαλιτῶν (10, 3), and Χλιατῶν (10, 4), see (Menander, 
fr.10.3, 120-124). In terms of form, Kholiatai must be a Hellenized ethnonym, see Dobrovits 2011, 391. 
According to Menander (, fr.10.3, 122-124), Kholiatai lived in a city that had fortresses. Their city was 
located near an enormous lake and the river Oekh which was not in a long distance from the lake. 
Alemany (2000, 183) identifies these two places with the lake Aral and the river Jaxartes/Syr Darya 
respectively. ”Κορδώσης (2012, 111) argues that the land of Kholiatai may be situated to the “west of 
Talas but not so close to the river Oech since the Byzantine delegation met with other tribes before 
their arriving at the Oech river”. Also, the Kholiatai must have been distinguished vassals since they 
were the only tribe that Silzibul consented to accompany the Byzantine embassy during their return to 
the Byzantine empire, see Menander, fr.10.3, 124). Many scholars identify the Kholiatai with the 
Khorazm (Vaissière 2005, 255; Dobrovits 2011, 391), because Khorezm was a sedentary civilization with 
a city and fortresses. For the identification of Kholiatai see also Litvinsky 1996, 184; Vailhé 1909, 211, 
Menander, n. 135 and 140, 264-266. 
182 For “The name of the Kirghiz” see Pulleyblank 1990, 98-108; Moravcsik (1958, 344) tried to emend 
this form and read Kherkhis. Klaproth (1826, 117) had read this ethnonym as Kherkhiz or Khirkiz. 
According to scholars (Dobrovits 2011, 396) these people were identified with the Yenisey Khirghiz who 
lived far north of the Old Türks.  
183 This place, which has the same name with the river Talas, is located between the rivers Chu and 
Jaxartes and is well known from Chinese and Arabic writers (Chavannes 1900, 238).  
184 Menander, fr.10.3, 122-123. 
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 John of Ephesus recounts another incident. According to his account185, Silzibul 
dismissed the Persian envoys in anger threatening to kill them for they tried to deceive 
him. The Persian delegation claimed that the king of the Romans were their slave and 
he paid a yearly tribute as a slave186. Zemarchus not only refuted the Persian allegation 
but also he evoked the memory of Trajan, who occupied Mesopotamia and erected 
his statue in their land.  
After the departure of the Persian ambassadors Silzibul reaffirmed his 
declarations of friendship for the Byzantines in front of Zemarchus and his party, 
whom he sent them back to their home accompanied by another Türk embassy.  Since 
Maniakh died in the meantime, the Byzantine delegation was escorted by a new 
ambassador who was named Taghma and held the title of Tarkhan187. It is possible 
that the purpose of the particular embassy was to urge the Byzantines to launch a joint 
attack on the Persians since in the following years (572) Justin II encouraged by the 
Türk marched out against their common enemy 188. The son of Maniakh was also a 
member of the Türk delegation and despite his young age he ranked immediately after 
the leader of the embassy because his father had been loyal to Silzibul189. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the title of the ambassador was bequeathed to the 
young man by his father taking to account that Maniakh τῶν Σογδαϊτῶν 
προειστήκει190. This would be beneficiary for both ethnicities, since the Sogdians could 
ensure the continuity of their ruling class and the Türks served their interests without 
having to change the social structure of their vassals191. 
Zemarchus and his companions went to the land of Kholiatai to join up with 
the rest of the delegation that was dispatched there earlier and had been told to await 
their leader’s return. Thenceforth, they began their journey home leaving the capital 
of Kholiatai and travelling through fortresses. As the rumor spread among the 
                                                          
185 John of Ephesus, VI.23, 426-428. 
186 John of Ephesus, VI.23, 426. 
187 Moravcsik 1958, 299 claims that the term was a Bulgaro-turkic word used by the Türks of envoys or 
counsellors; Cahun (1896, 58) argues that the term Tarkhan derives from the root tara and Khan which 
means “seigneur de labours”. See also Κορδώσης 2012, 110: “Since Taramak or tarimak means to 
cultivate land, Tarkhan were the lords of sedentary agricultural societies who were vassals of the Türks”. 
188 Κορδώσης 2012, 115  
189 Menander, fr.10.3, 122- 123; Sinor 1990, 303–304. 
190 Menander, fr.10.1, 114. 
191 Κορδώσης 2012, 110. 
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neighboring tribes that the Byzantine envoys, accompanied by a Türk delegation, were 
returning to their home, the local leaders requested Silzibul’s consent to be allowed 
to send some of their people ἐπὶ θέαν τῆς Ρωμαϊκῆς πολιτείας192. Silzibul granted the 
permission only to the ruler of Kholiatai, whom the Byzantines received him across the 
river Oech and after a long journey they all came to a huge lake, in which they rested 
for three days. From there Zemarchus sent off a certain George with a letter informing 
the Emperor about their return from the Türks193. George escorted by twelve Türks 
took a waterless, desert but shortest route that probably concluded to the Caspian 
Sea and then they travelled by ship194. 
John of Ephesus makes no reference to the journey back of Zemarchus 
delegation except that the envoys returned after an absence of two years195. 
Menander, however, gives a more detailed account of it but the reconstruction of the 
route that Zemarchus took from Talas cannot be made with certainty. This is due to 
the fact that the physical geography of Central Asia has changed drastically since 
antiquity and neither the river Oekh nor the huge lagoon can be identified without any 
doubts196. The major issue for the reconstruction197 of the return journey of Byzantine 
delegation is the identification of the River Oech with the river Jaxartes198 or the river 
Oxus199. Nevertheless, Zemarchus might have travelled along the river Oxus until he 
arrived at the Sea of Aral. After a twelve day journey at the shady shores of the lake 
Aral and having crossed some difficult terrains, he passed the rivers Emba (Ich), Ural 
                                                          
192 Menander, fr.10.4, 124. Κορδώσης 2012, 111 :The fact that different tribes asked Silzibul’s 
permission to be allowed to visit the Byzantine Empire means that not only the Türks had subjugated 
these tribes but also they had consolidated and extended their power to west of the Caspian Sea making 
the contacts between them and Byzantines easier. Moreover, since the Türks had under their control 
the routes led to Byzantium, their vassals could promote their products to Byzantine Empire as their 
overlords ensured the safety of the routes.  
193 According to Dobrovits (2011, 393) they probably carried out a kind of military intelligence on the 
lands they travelled. 
194 Blockley believes (Menander, n. 141, 266) that George did not took a vastly different route while 
Dobrovits (2011, 396) argues that George followed the same route with Zemarchus at least until he 
passed the Volga River.  
195 John of Ephesus, VI.23, 428. 
196 Menander, n. 140, 265-266. Blockley believes that the river Oekh could identified not only with 
Jaxartes or Oxus that the majority of the scholars propose but with any river west of Talas whether now 
existing or not. Moreover, he argues that the enormous wide lake was not Aral but the Caspian Sea at 
which Zemarchus arrived after a twelve days’ journey away from the river Emba. 
197 For the reconstruction of Zemarchus’ travel see Κορδώσης 1996, 117-118; Alemany 2000, 183; Zhang 
Xu-Shan 1998b, 127. 
198 Alemany 2000, 183.  
199 Κορδώσης, 1996, 117-118. 
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(Daich) and Volga (Attila) he came to the land of the Ugurs, which was under Silzibul’s 
sovereignty200. The Ugurs revealed to the Byzantine delegation that by the river 
Kophen201 four thousand Persians were stationed in ambush to take them prisoners 
as they passed202. Therefore, helped by the Ugurs, the envoys were supplied with 
water in order to cross the desert. Afterwards, having passed a lagoon with great body 
of water, they arrived at lakes into which the river Kophen empties203.For fear of being 
attacked by the Persians and the tribe of Oromuskhi204 the envoys proceeded with 
great caution until the reach the land of Alans. 
The ruler of the Alans, Sarosius205 gladly received Zemarchus and his retinue 
but he refused to admit the Türk envoys unless they disarmed206. Finally, the Türks 
laid down their weapons with Zemarchus‘mediation after a three day of dispute. 
Sarosius advised Zemarchus to avoid the road through the land of Miusiamians since 
the Persians had set up an ambush and awaited them. In order to deceive the Persians 
Zemarchus sent ten porters carrying silk on the expected route to make it seem that 
he was coming next, while he made a detour by the road called Dareine. Afterwards, 
the delegation arrived at the Black Sea, where they took the ship to the river Phasis 
and then to Trapezus, whence they rode post to Byzantium. When the envoys reach 
the Byzantine capital, they were granted audience by the Emperor and told him 
everything207.  
Zemarchus delegation had successfully accomplished its objectives in terms of 
diplomatic and economic relations. First of all the Byzantine- Türk friendship was 
officially established. From that point both states were allied against their common 
                                                          
200 Menander, n. 146, 266: “By the date of Zemarchus’ arrival there (mid 571) Turkish power had passed 
the Volga”.  
201 Menander, n. 145, 266;” Kophen is the ancient name of the river Kabul in Afghanistan. … Here it is 
identified with the Kuma.” Sea also Dobrovits 2011, 395. 
202 Menander, fr.10.4, 124-125. 
203 Dobrovits 2011, 395: “…lake mentioned here is merely the small bay of the Caspian Sea into which 
the Kuma really empties”. 
204 The Oromuskhi are identified with Moskhoi who according to Procopius (History of Wars VIII.2. 24-
26) lived between Lazica and Iberia. In Menander they appear to be north of the land of Alans. See 
Menander, n. 147, 266; 
205 John of Epiphania (I.2, 274) claims that the Persians tried to bribe the ruler of the Alans to kill 
Zemarchus and his retinue, but the Alans mentioned this to the Byzantines. 
206 Κορδώσης (2012, 113) claims that the Alans were suspicious towards the Türks due to their 
increasing power. They probably believed that sooner or later the Türks would attack them.  
207 Menander, fr.10.5, 126-127. 
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enemies, the Avars but most of all the Persians. The Byzantines found not only a strong 
ally operating in the rear of the Persians with his own forces but also a new supplier 
for the raw silk without the Persian mediation. Indeed, the Byzantine delegation 
returned to Constantinople laden with silk208. The importance of Zemarchus’ mission 
is depicted by the fact that the Persians tried set up an ambush for the Byzantine 
delegation, on its way to Constantinople. Moreover, to balance the new situation the 
Persians attempted to bribe the Alans and the Sabirs in order to be on their side and 
undertook an expedition in Arabia Felix aiming at cutting off the Byzantines from the 
sea silk route209. 
 
2.4. Embassies between Byzantines and Türks until 576 
(According to Menander Protector) 
Justin II seems that he had realized the importance of having a stable ally 
operating in the rear of the Persian empire. Therefore, he tried to consolidate the 
Byzantine- Türk alliance by frequent diplomatic contacts between the two nations. 
According to Menander five embassies were exchanged between 568 and 576. 
Beyond the names of their leaders little information is provided concerning these 
delegations, since the historian focuses on the Valentinus’ mission. Actually, a brief 
reference is made to them on the occasion of the 106 Türk envoys who accompanied 
the embassy of 576 and had been left behind in Constantinople by previous Türk 
delegations. So, Menander writes: 
At that time Türks, who had been sent by their various tribes on various 
occasions, had been in Byzantium for a long while. Some Anankhast, when he had 
come to Byzantium on an embassy, had brought three with him; some had come to the 
capital with Eutychius; others staying there had arrived with Valentinus himself on an 
earlier occasion (for he went twice as envoy to the Türks); and still others had come 
with Herodian and with Paul the Cicilian…210 . 
                                                          
208 Menander, fr.10.5, 126-127. 
209 Κορδώσης 2012, 113. 
210 Menander, 19.1, 170.  
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The names of the leaders of the Byzantine embassies to the Türks were 
Eutychius, Valentinus (he was the same person that headed the delegation of 576), 
Herodian and Paul the Cicilian. Anankhast211 is believed not to be a Roman 
representative due to the similarity of his name with the leader of the Utigurs, 
Anagai212, who appears in Menander’s text below. Moreover, due to the fact that in 
the original text is written , when he had come to Byzantium on an embassy, this 
probably means that Anankhast was a Türk envoy, who arrived at the Byzantine capital 
under the command of his khagan. 
In addition, it appears that when an embassy was sent from the Byzantines to 
the Türks and vice versa, it was accompanied by the previous delegation returning 
home213. Therefore, the first Türk delegation led by Maniakh returned home escorted 
by Zemarchus’ embassy to the Türks. Zemarchus in turn was accompanied by Taghma 
and his retinue upon his return to Constantinople. The 106 Türks who had been left 
behind by previous delegations went with Valentinus ‘embassy (576).  Nevertheless, 
the Türk ambassadors, who came at Constantinople under the leadership of Taghma 
probably were not included among the 106 Türks214 since there is no reference to this 
particular name among the other names of the ambassadors who brought with them 
Türks at the byzantine capital. Thus, it can be concluded that either these ambassadors 
had left with Taghma, which is not possible due to the fact that the alliance between 
the two nations had just been established and the Byzantines would have been willing 
to provide them with splendid reception and accommodation or Menander had 
omitted from his text some of the Türk envoys215. 
Also, it is noteworthy that between the years 569 (the return of Zemarchus) 
and 576, the exchange of delegations was so frequent that it shows the eagerness of 
the Byzantine court to maintain the Byzantine- Türk alliance. Taking into account that 
Zemarchus’ mission lasted two years216  the rest of the embassies probably needed 
less time, since Zemarchus was delayed due to his participation in Silzibul’s campaign 
                                                          
211 Moravcsik 1958, 69. 
212 Menander, 19.1, 172-173 and 178-179. 
213 Κορδώσης 2012, 118, Sinor  1977, 43 and 1969, 107. 
214Κορδώσης 2012, 118.   
215 Κορδώσης 2012, 118-119. 
216 John of Ephesus 1860, 428. 
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against the Persians and his stay at the land of Kholiatae. Therefore, the time period 
that included the arrival of a Byzantine embassy at the mount Ektag, its stay and return 
must not have exceeded half a year. This estimation is based on the fact that each 
delegation probably used the experience of the previous one and the envoys’ journey 
was facilitated by the fact that the Türks had expanded westwards and had under their 
control most of the territories which the delegations had to traverse. Consequently, it 
is possible that during the seven years intervening between the embassies of 
Zemarchus and Valentinus four or five delegations may have been sent to the see of 
the khanate of the Western Türks. 
To sum up, Justin II seized the opportunity to establish a Byzantine- Türk 
alliance due to commercial and political reasons, as it will be explained in the chapters 
to follow. As it has been aforementioned, the Byzantines aimed at a second supply 
route, bypassing the Persian lands, in order to avoid taxes and duties levied on goods, 
especially on the raw silk by the Sassanid emperors. Therefore, they preferred the 
trade route running to the north of the Aral and the Caspian Sea that came through 
the lands controlled by the Western Türks. Apart from that, the new allies were willing 
to confine the Persian menace in the Middle East front of the Byzantines so that the 
latter would be in the position to resist more effectively the permanent attacks of the 
barbarians on its northern frontiers. Also, it seemed possible that if the Byzantines 
together with the Türks waged a struggle on two fronts against the Persians, then they 
might succeeded in destroying their common enemy217, a plan which, as we will see, 
was realized during Heraclius’ reign. As a result of that, the diplomatic contacts 
between the two countries were so frequent that the embassies travel jointly, a new 
one escorting the one returning to its homeland.  
  
                                                          
217 Κορδώσης 2012, 120. 
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2.5. The 576 Byzantine embassy to the Türks and the brief 
breach of the Byzantino- Türk alliance 
(According to Menander Protector) 
The last Byzantine embassy to the Türks, headed by Valentinus218, was sent 
in 576, namely the second year of Tiberius’ reign219. Tiberius was appointed as 
Caesar220 in 574221 when Justin II became incapable of discharging his duties as the 
emperor of the Byzantine Empire due to mental illness222. Therefore, Valentinus was 
assigned to announce, amongst others, the accession of Tiberius to the Türk Khagan 
and cement the existing alliance223.  
 As it was aforementioned, apart from his attendants Valentinus was 
accompanied by 106 Türks who had probably accumulated gradually and resided in 
Constantinople224. Instead of taking the route through Caucasus, the envoys took the 
northern route via Crimea225. First, they travelled by ship from Sinope to Cherson. 
Then, after crossıng through Apatura, Phouloi, a Scythian province ruled by a woman 
called Akkagas, subject to Anagai226 and generally speaking areas covered with water 
and rough terrain227, they finally arrived at πολεμικά σύμβολα228 of Turxantus229.  
                                                          
218 Menender, n. 216, 275. “He was probably a spatharius” 
219 Menender, n.235, 277. 
220 For Tiberius’ accession to the throne and coronation see also Gibbon 1776, XLV, part II.  
221 According to Κορδώσης (2012, 121) the previous delegatıon led by Paul the Cicilian must have taken 
place little before Tiberius’ elevation to the rank of the emperor.  
222 Browning 1978, 211; Treadgold 1997, 222-223. 
223Menender, 19.1, 172-173; Golden, 1992, 130; Parker, 1896, 443; Sinor 1990, 304; Vailhé 1909, 213. 
224 Menender, 19.1, 1985, 170-171. 
225 Κορδώσης 2002, 166. 
226 According to Alemany (2000, 187).Anagai was the chief of the Utigurs who were located near the 
Sea of Azov.  
227 For a possible reconstruction of the journey see also Menender, n. 219, 275. Cahun, 1896, 115; 
Κορδώσης 2012, 121.  
228 Cahun, (1896, 115) considers that Menander’s πολεμικά σύμβολα is an equivalent of the Türk and 
Mongol ordou that signified a quartier general that combined a royal and military camp. 
229 Moravcsik 1958, 328; Menender 1985, n. 221, 276: “Turxanthus was apparently not a name but a 
rank (Türk-sad) below the Khagan”. Cf. Cahun 1896,115 believes that this name was disfigured, 
probably by the genitive form given to a Greek transcription “Τούρξας-Τούρξαντος” which refers to 
the” nom turc archaïque d'homme et de peuple Turkèch”. See also Sinor 1990, 304: “It can, however, 
be taken for granted that he was not the head - not even a primus inter pares - of the Western Turks… 
This appears clearly also from the fact that – his hostility towards the Romans notwithstanding - Turxath 
had their group proceed to the interior of the Turk territories to meet Tardu, without any doubt his 
superior”. 
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 Turxanthus was Silzibul’s son, who had recently died230. In reality, when the 
envoys arrived, Turxanthus was preparing to perform the obsequies. Despite the fact 
that he was the Khagan’s son he did not succeed his father to the supreme position of 
the khanate231. However, taking in to account his words232, it seems that he was acting 
on behalf of all the Türks, both of the western wing of the Khanate - under the 
command of Tardu233 - and of the eastern wing. Nevertheless, the possibility of acting 
on his own due to the long distances from the headquarters and his impulsive 
character should not be excluded234.  
According to Menander, Turxanthus administered one of the eight sections 
into to which the land of Türks was divided235. However, recollecting Maniakh’s 
statement that the Türk realm was divided into four principalities236 it becomes 
obvious that these statements are conflicting. It is also worth noting that John of 
Ephesus refers to the eight Türk chiefs who dwell further inland without including the 
one who began to lament when he saw the Byzantine envoys237. Moreover, 
Theophylactus Simocatta on this subject claims that the Türk tribes were divided into 
two parts238 which according to Kordoses239 means that the historian refers to the two 
district areas into which from 582 the Türk territory was divided, without mentioning 
lower in rank khagans.  
Bury240, in his effort to explain the quadruple of 568 and the octuple of 567 
division of the Türk territory states that there were two independent realms. The one 
was located on the northern Golden Mountain and the other on the southern Golden 
Mountain. These Türk realms were organized on the same principle: both of them 
were divided into four sections and were governed by a supreme khagan. So, in 568 
                                                          
230 On Silzibul’s death, see Cahun 1896, 114. 
231 Bury 1897, 420. 
232 Menander 1985, 174: “ἐμοὶ γὰρ ὑποκέκλιται πᾶσα ἡ γῆ ἀρχόμενη μὲν ἐκ τῶν τοῦ ἡλίου πρώτων 
ἀκτίνων, καταλήγουσα δὲ ἐς τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἑσπέρας”. 
233 Tardu is identified with the khagan Tat’eou of the Chinese sources. See Bury 1897, 421; Chavannes, 
1900, 241; Parker 1896, 444. 
234 Κορδώσης 2012, 128-129. 
235 Menander,19.1, 172: “ἐν ὀκτὼ γὰρ μοίρας διεδάσαντο τὰ ἐκείνη ἅπαντα, εἷς γε τοῦ φύλλου τῶν 
Τούρκων ἔλαχε προεστάναι” 
236 Menander, 10.1, 114-115. 
237 John of Ephesus, VI.23, 425. 
238 Theophylactus Simocatta, 260: “δυσῖ δὲ μεγίστοις τισὶ τὰ Τούρκων ἔθνη μεγαλαυχεῖ” 
239 Κορδώσης 2012, 123.  
240 Bury 1897, 420-421. 
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the Byzantines knew only about the four districts of Silzibul’s northern realm. However 
in 576 the Byzantines were informed as well on the southern realm as they travelled 
into further Türk territory.  
Afterwards, Menander mentions the name of Arsilas, who was the eldest or 
the supreme ruler of all the Türks241. Despite the fact that the status of Arsilas is 
unclear since παλαιτέρῳ could have both the meanings of the eldest or the supreme 
ruler, most scholars242 prefer the first view. Moreover, while the name Arsilas is 
commonly connected with the Türk word arslan which means lion243, Beckwith 
believes that the particular name is the Greek rendering of the name of the ruling clan, 
A-shih-na244.   
In addition, it is rather interesting the fact that all the Türk ambassadors who 
resided at Constaninople left en masse and escorted Valentinus’ embassy. Although 
Menander does not mention anything that could justify the sudden departure of the 
106 Türk envoys, it can be inferred from the hostile reception of Valentinus by 
Turxanthus, that the Byzantine- Türk relations had become strained for some 
reason245. So, it is likely that either a certain Türk envoy was deliberately dispatched 
in the Byzantine capital in order to carry the Khagan’s order for the immediate 
withdrawal of all the Türk ambassadors or the Türk envoy who accompanied the 
penultimate Byzantine ambassador in his return journey at Constantinople was 
entrusted with this task246. 
Turxanthus was the first Türk leader whom Valentinus met. When the 
Byzantine envoys presented their credentials and announced the Tiberius’ ascension 
to the Byzantine throne, they requested that Turxanthus reconfirm the treaty that had 
been made earlier between Justin II and Silzibul, when Zemarchus visited their land. 
On that occasion, Silzibul had declared that he would have the same friends and 
enemies with the Byzantines and that his decision would be unbreakable and 
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inviolable247. Therefore, Valentinus based on the aforementioned treaty, urged the 
Türks to abide by the treaty and attack their mutual enemy, the Persians since the 
Romans were at war with them at that particular time.  
Contrary to the etiquette of an embassy’s reception Turxanthus behaved so 
coarsely and menacingly towards the Byzantine envoys that Menander characterized 
him as an arrogant man who loved to boast248. Extremely outraged, he accused the 
Byzantines of using ten tongues but one deceit, namely to lie to everyone249. Placing 
his fingers in his mouth he blamed them for deceiving every nation that mixes with 
them. Moreover, he added that the Byzantines on the one hand flattered all the tribes 
with their various speeches and treacherous designs but on the other they deceived 
them taking all the benefits for themselves, when their alleged friends fell into 
misfortune.  
Afterwards, Turxantus passed from general insults and concrete grievances to 
threats. He threatened to deprive the Byzantine envoys of their lives since they were 
also dressed with lies and lie was foreign and alien to a Türk250. After uttering some 
threats against the emperor he accused him of treachery and duplicity since the 
emperor was the one who had broken their earlier treaty of friendship by making an 
alliance251 with the Varchonitai, even though he knew that they were their subjects, 
who had escaped from the Türks’ sovereignty. Turxanthus continued to boast of his 
supremacy over the Pseudo-Avars declaring that the Varchonitai would be again his 
subjects and that if he sent his cavalry against them they would flee to the lower 
reaches of the earth; and if the Varchonitai reacted against the Türk authority, they 
would be killed not by sword but trampled under the hooves of the horses like the 
ants252.  
Then, Turxanthus blamed the Byzantines for yet another reason. The 
Byzantines used to conduct the Türk envoys through the routes traversing Caucasus, 
when the latter travel to Byzantium. According to him, the Byzantines were not 
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revealing the easier way to their land deliberately, because they thought that the 
roughness of the ground might deter the Türks from attacking the Roman territory. 
Thus, although the Byzantines where assuring that there was no other route for the 
Türks to take, their slaves, the Varchonitai had taken it to run away from them. Then, 
Turxanthus, declaring that he knew the invasion route to Constantinople- crossing the 
rivers Dnieper, Danube and Hebrus-, boasted full of confidence that he was no 
ignorant of the Byzantine strength since the whole world was subject to his dominion. 
He also emphasized on the fate of the Alans and the Unigurs, who dared to face the 
invincible Türk might and finally became their slaves253, indicating thereby, what the 
consequences of resistance to the Türks were. 
Valentinus arriving as a friend of the Türks was taken aback by Turxanthus' ill-
tempered and menacing outbursts which were caused by the fact the Byzantines had 
offered refuge to his vassals254. Thus, Valentinus was in an awkward predicament 
seeing that if he refuted the charges directly he would have acknowledged the 
Byzantines’ weakness to control the Avars. Therefore, he used his eloquence in order 
to soothe Turxanthus’ anger by giving a cliché-riddled reply that carefully skirted the 
charges255. So, in the first place he replied that the Türk Khagan’s accusations were so 
cruel and grievous that he would prefer to die instead of hearing that his emperor 
rejoiced in deceit and that his envoys were liars. Moreover, he tried to convince 
Turxanthus not to violate the laws that protected the envoys seeing that the Byzantine 
came as agents of peace256, otherwise he would commit an infamy. Then, Valentinus 
emphasized on the fact that since Turxanthus inherited Silzibul’s possessions he also 
inherited the paternal friends whom he ought to consider also as friends, for Silzibul 
with his own volition chose to be allied with the Byzantines and not with the Persians. 
In addition, until that moment the Byzantines had respected the alliance and 
maintained friendly feelings towards the Türks. Thus, Valentinus ended his speech by 
making an appeal to Turxanthus’ ethos and expressing his certainty that the Türk 
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Khagan’s friendship would be equally firm and that he would behave properly towards 
the one close to him.257  
Although Turxanthus did not realized his threats to kill the envoys, he obliged 
them to attend Sizabul’s funeral, who was ἀρτιθανὴς258. Furthermore, he order the 
Byzantines to slash their cheeks with own daggers in a token of a grief since the burial 
customs required259. The following days Turxanthus, sacrificed four Hunnic captives in 
his father’s honor. After completing Silzibul’s burial rites and having talked with 
Valentinus many times, he sent off the Byzantine embassy further into the interior of 
the land of the Türks, where they met with other chiefs, among which his brother 
Tardu260, who was stationed in Mount Ektel261.  
As Turxanthus was not content with making only idle treats, he declared that 
he would capture the town of Bosporus, which was located on the easternmost side 
of the Crimean peninsula. Therefore, as soon as Valentinus left, Turxanthus dispatched 
Bokhan to reinforce the Türk forces under Anagai, the leader of the Utigurs who had 
already camped in the area. After laying the siege, the city of Bosporus fell to them in 
576262. The Türks stayed at the area until 581, when they appeared before the walls 
of Cherson263. 
So, according to Menander the Türks had been provoked Romans, while the 
Byzantine envoys were detained and ill-treated by Turxanthus264. Although the 
Byzantine delegation was insulted and mocked, they hoped that Turxanthus and his 
brother Tardu would keep their father’s policy towards the Byzantines. Also, despite 
the fact that Menander does not mention anything that had been spoken between 
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Tardu and the Byzantine delegation, it is assumed that the Türk Khagan did not 
disappoint them, when they met him265. So, the Byzantine ambassadors thought that 
Turxanthus declarations to besiege the city of Bosporus were merely threats of a 
subordinate arrogant ruler, otherwise, they would not be so surprised, when they saw 
with their own eyes the city of Bosporus being captured by the Türks. 
 Nevertheless, it seems that Turxanthus served his brother ambitious plan to 
dominate the whole Asia266. Thus, the fact that Valentinus and his escort were kept in 
captivity for some time during which they sustained heavy humiliations displayed 
Turks’ intentions to attack the Byzantine possessions267. Consequently, the Byzantine-
Türk alliance, which lasted for eight years, came into an abrupt end. 
The change of the Türk attitude towards the Byzantines had already been seen 
when all the Türk envoys withdrew from Constantinople and accompanied the 
Byzantine delegation that was dispatched to the Türk Khagan. The Byzantines were 
indeed in an awkward predicament seeing that on the one hand their relations with 
their previous allies were strained268 and on the other they could not repel the 
Persians without the Türks’ aid. So, taking into account the gravity of the situation, the 
Byzantines chose Valentinus as the leader of the delegation in order to request the 
Türk Khagan to attack the Persians269 due to the fact that Valentinus had previous 
experience in the negotiations with the Türks. 
Turxanthus’ speech contains several clues according to which the hostile 
reception of the Byzantine envoys by the Türks may be explained. There is a grain of 
truth in Turxanthus’ accusations on the Byzantines of duplicity since the latter were 
not always adherent to agreements that they made with other tribes270. The Türk 
leader presented as a common practice the fact that on the one hand the Byzantines 
                                                          
265 Κορδώσης 2012, 137 
266 Κορδώσης 2012, 137: “Chinese were humbly asking for east Turkish friendship, Persians were 
already humiliated and now it was about the time for the Byzantines”. 
267 Κορδώσης 2012, 136. 
268 Sinor 1977, 433. 
269 Κορδώσης 2012, 128. 
56Κορδώσης 2012, 129. See also Whitby 2008, 125 “Overall there is little evidence for respect or trust 
in Roman dealings with European neighbours: deceit was a way to avert war, or to reduce its impact 
when it inevitably came, and diplomacy had to contribute to achieving these important benefits; 
scrupulous adherence to agreements and obligations would not have brought much advantage in this 
ever-changing arena” 
41 
 
deceived all the tribes by flattering them with their speech and treacherous designs 
but on the other they abandoned them after taking all the benefits for themselves271. 
Indeed, the principle the “end justifies the means” was valid in the political affairs of 
the Byzantines with the other people272. For instance, the tactic of turning the one 
tribe against the other such as in the case of the Utigurs and Kutrigurs, during 
Justinian’s reign (551), displays how the Byzantines manipulated the tribes to their 
own benefit273. Nevertheless, neither the Byzantines nor their tribal neighbors were 
expected to be reliable in terms of political obligations274 as the barbarians also 
deployed their own means to take advantage of the Byzantines. Bajan, for example, 
did not hesitate to swear the Avar and Roman oaths in his effort to conceal his plans 
for the construction of the bridge over Sava275.  
The main reason for Turxanthus discontentment was the refuge that 
Byzantium had offered to the Varchonitai whom the Türk considered their rebellious 
subjects276. So, while the Türks demanded a stable alliance against the Avars277 and 
the Persians, who were their mutual enemies, the Byzantines violated the agreement 
by harboring the fugitive Avars278. Actually, Justin II refused to yield to the Avar 
demands despite Tiberius’ recommendations until 571, when the Avars had inflicted 
a defeat on the byzantine forces (571)279. Afterwards, the Avars encouraged by the 
Persian victories over the Byzantines (573)280 crossed Danube and defeated for second 
time the Byzantine army in 574. The disastrous outcome of the battle and Tiberius’ 
decision to throw the Byzantine forces into the Persian war led to the conclusion of 
the treaty according to which the Byzantines had to pay a yearly tribute of 80,000 
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pieces of gold281. The result of this treaty was to cease the Avar hostilities at least until 
579. In addition, the Avars agreed to make a war on the Slavs, who had plundered the 
Roman territories, since the Byzantine army was occupied at the Persian front282. So, 
it might be the treaty of 574 that caused the wrath of the Türks and perceived as a 
violation of the agreement on the part of the Byzantines283. 
The second accusation of Turxanthus concerned the route that the Türk envoys 
were obliged to take in order to travel to Constantinople. According to Turxanthus his 
envoys were being escorted over the mountain Caucasus instead of being allowed to 
take the easier way crossing the rivers Dneiper, Danube and Hebrus284 under the 
pretext that there was no other way to travel to the Byzantine capital285. Turxanthus’ 
point that the Byzantines had revealed only the way through Caucasus due to the fact 
that the difficult terrain would deter them from attacking the Byzantine territories 
may not have been unfounded. Actually, during the middle ages, delegations from 
inimical countries acquired topographical knowledge from the local ambassadors in 
order to attack other countries286.  
However, the choice of the trans-Caucasian route in order to prevent the Türks 
from intelligence gathering or an imminent attack due to the difficult terrain may not 
have been the actual case. Valentinus had revealed to the 106 Türk envoys, who 
accompanied him, another route, which required navy, through Crimea. Moreover, 
the route through Dnieper, Danube and Hebrus was easier but much longer for 
delegations that had to travel eastwards. So, since the route through Crimea required 
the existence of a navy that the Türks could not use for war operations and the 
alternative route through the rivers was longer, the most common way for the Türks 
to travel to Constantinople was through Caucasus. So, Turxanthus’ allusion to the 
easier route through the rivers may be perceived as a warning against Byzantium from 
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the same direction that was already used by the Varchonitai (Avars) and other raiders 
when they invaded the Byzantine hinterland287 . 
In addition, the Byzantines consented unwillingly to the Byzantine –Avar treaty 
of 574288, otherwise the Empire would have been involved in a war on two fronts – 
against the Avars and the Persians- which exceeded the military resources of the 
Empire at that particular time289. Furthermore, the Byzantines might not be 
considered to have violated all the terms of the Byzantine-Türk treaty since their 
forces were tied up in the eastern front, waging wars against the other mutual enemy, 
the Persians. Consequently, Turxanthus may have used these accusations as a pretext 
for justifying his real intentions which were to break the alliance that was made by 
Silzibul and proceed to war against the Byzantines290.  
It is quite possible that behind the words of Turxanthus there was a conflict of 
interests that concerned the patronage of the Alans291 and the Unigurs tribes. The 
Byzantines had established friendly relations with the Alans292 and the Unigurs with 
whose help they tried to build a new balance of power to the West of the Caspian 
Sea293. Thus, on the one hand the Byzantines used both allies to intercept the Türk 
advent294, on the other the Türks were extended to the west of the Caspian Sea295. 
Consequently, the Türks mutated into the Empire’s enemies since they conquered the 
Byzantines’ allies and threatened the Empire’s integrity. Moreover, the Türks invaded 
Crimea, which was the western terminus of the northern Silk Route, aiming at having 
under their control silk trade from China up to the Blak Sea296.  
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So, it was a matter of time that a conflict between the Byzantines and the Türks 
would break out. As long as Silzibul lived the alliance was maintained. When he died, 
Turxanthus found a pretext to liberate himself from complying with the terms of the 
treaty297. The Türk leader probably aware of the Byzantines’ weakness,298 decided to 
extract the maximum advantage from it. Thus, the Türk forces crossed the straits of 
Bosporus299 and conquered the city (576). The attack to the city of Bosporus signaled 
the end of the Byzantine- Türk alliance300, albeit for a short period. By the mid 579 the 
Türks were at Cherson and overrun the whole Crimea. 
 
2.6. Possible Byzantine embassy to the Türks in 579 
While in 576 the city of Bosporus was besieged and captured by the Türks, in 
579, the Avars began to construct a bridge across the river Save between the cities of 
Sirmium and Singidunun. At that particular time the Avars considered themselves 
strong enough to question the Byzantine rule to the south of the Danube due to the 
fact that the Byzantine troops were tied up in the Eastern frontier fighting against the 
Persians301. Therefore, the city of Sirmium became Baian’s main objective302 since, 
provided it was captured, it would be used as an Avar base in the North-Western 
Balkans from where they could lance their attacks.  
When the general of Singidunum, Sethus summoned them to withdraw their 
forces from the river Save, warning that otherwise their actions would be considered 
as a violation of a firm peace and friendship, they justified their actions by saying that 
they built the bridge in order to attack the Slavs303. In spite of Baian’s oaths, the Avars 
did not convince the Byzantine general who dispatched the Avar envoys to the 
Emperor. Tiberius, upon hearing their message, realized304 that the Avars were 
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planning to cut off the supplies routes to Sirmium by using the bridge they built on the 
river Save. In this case the citizens would starve and the Avars would demand its 
surrender.  
Seeing that the Byzantine Empire lacked even the tiniest military force at the 
northern frontier, Tiberius decided to take advantage of the Türk presence at the 
Crimean peninsula in order to intimidate the Avars305. Thus, pretending that he had 
not perceived Baian’s plan he proposed them to postpone their assault against the 
Slaves since the Türks, who were encamped at Cherson306, might quickly be informed 
of the Avar movements and launce punitive attacks against them307. He also certified 
the envoys that he would pass any information to the Khagan when he ascertained 
the Türk intentions.308 
In a few days another Avar embassy was granted an audience with the Emperor 
announcing that the Khagan demanded the surrender of Sirmium and the withdrawal 
of the Byzantine army and the citizens from the city with their belongings before the 
end of autumn309. The ambassadors justified their Khagan’s claim by using two 
arguments. Firstly, it was considered that Sirmium rightfully belonged to the Avars 
seeing that it was a former possession of the Gepids, who had been conquered by 
them310. Secondly, the Byzantines were obliged to comply with the Avar claims since 
they had not available army to oppose them311. Moreover, they emphasized on the 
fact that the construction of the bridge was completed and consequently they were 
prepared to cut the city off from the other Byzantine strongholds on the Danube. 
The Byzantine emperor stunned at the Avar claims prepared for an imminent 
siege of 
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 Sirmium. Due to the fact that there was no army in the Balkans at that time 
Tiberius ordered the garrison troops of Illyricum and Dalmatia to defend the city312. 
Moreover, he made an effort to recruit troops from other tribes that would attack the 
Avars in the rear. According to John of Ephesus Tiberius sent secretly a delegation to 
the Lombards requesting their help313. It is also possible that the Byzantines 
dispatched a delegation to the Türks314, who had advanced on the Crimean peninsula. 
Nevertheless, Tiberius’ efforts to recruit the Lombard and the Türk help were in vein. 
After a siege of two years (582) Sirmium was surrendered to the Avars315 on condition 
that the inhabitants would be allowed to leave316.  
 
2.7. Possible Byzantine embassy to the Türks in 584 
(According to John of Ephesus) 
Maurice concluded a treaty with the Avars (582) from the beginning of his 
reign. The particular treaty was maintained until 584 when the Emperor refused to 
consent to a further increase in the Avar subsidy fearing that the easy acquiescence 
would encourage further extortion317. As a result of that, the Avars seized Singidunum, 
Viminacium, and other city-fortresses on the Danube. They also raided the suburbs of 
Anchialus, where they spent their winter, and according to John of Ephesus they 
prepared to besiege Constantinople318.  Thus, once more the Byzantine Empire was in 
a predicament having to wage wars on two fronts against the Persians and the Avars. 
In addition, the situation became more complicated since the Türks had occupied the 
Byzantine territories in Crimea and the Byzantines concluded a treaty with the Avars, 
who were the Türks’ irreconcilable enemies.  
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However, it seems that at that particular time the Byzantine-Türk relations 
were improved319. Despite the fact that there are no written sources to certify an 
exchange of embassies, the two nation came close to each other as it can be deduced 
by the fact that the Türks became the only factor that limited Avar expansion in the 
Northern Balkans320. According to John of Ephesus the Avars were obliged to fall back 
to Sirmium seeing that the Türks were raiding their territories321. So, as it can be 
inferred from the source, it is likely that Maurice dispatched a delegation (584) to the 
Türks or to their subject tribes, (who needed not belong to the same clan with the 
Türks but they might be members of other Türk tribes such as the Khazars) aiming at 
requiring their help in order to confront the Avar raids322. However, the Türks did not 
perish the Avars under the hooves of their horses323 as they had claimed. Instead of 
that, they got paid with eight centenaria of gold in order to withdraw their forces from 
the territory324.Although the Türks came in consultation with the Avar325, the 
Byzantines provinces were relieved from the Avar aggressiveness at least for that 
moment and the Türks became a regulating factor not only in Central Asia but also in 
the Balkans.  
To sum up, the sources make an indirect reference to the two Byzantine 
embassies dispatched to the Türks (the one in 579 during Tiberius’ reign and the other 
in 584, two years after Maurice’s ascension to the throne) on the occasion of the Avar 
raids. We cannot be sure if the embassies were sent to the khagan (Tardu) of the west 
                                                          
319 The Türk unity was undermined since internal strives broke out between the western and eastern 
khanate caused to a great extent by the intervention of the Chinese diplomacy (see Christian 1998, 257-
261; Κορδώσης 2012, 149-153.) Although it is beyond the scope of the particular study to analyze the 
causes of the Türk civil war, it is worth mentioning that the Türks changed their stance towards the 
Byzantines after their withdrawal from Crimea (581) and the loss of their suzerainty over the territories 
that they had conquered from the Chinese borders up to the Black Sea. Probably, the change of the 
Türk attitude can be attribute to the fact that the Byzantines were still engaged in the war against the 
Persians complying with the terms of the 568 treaty. Moreover, according to Κορδώσης (2008, 111) 
“the Avars were considered by the Türks not only as their long-established enemy but also as 
competitors force residing in the westernmost parts of their domain”. Consequently, it is likely that the 
Türks helped the Byzantines due to fact that they could be used as their counterweigh to the Avar 
aggressiveness  
320 Szádeczky-Kardoss 1990, 209. 
321 John of Ephesus 45-49 quoted by Καρδαράς 2010, 72, Κορδώσης 2012, 146. 
322 Κορδώσης 2012, 146-147. 
323 Menander, 19.1, 174-175. 
324 Καρδαράς 2010, 71-72; Κορδώσης 2012, 146-147. 
325 Κορδώσης 2012, 146-147: “… it can be deduced that the Türks came in to consultations with the 
Avars due to economic difficulties”   
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wing of the Khanate of the Trüks in Central Asia (such as previous embassies) or visited 
the deputies of the Türks in the northern steppes of the Black Sea. However, it is more 
likely that the Byzantine delegations conversed with the Türks’ deputies taking into 
consideration that Tardu was engaged with repressing the tribal revolutions in Central 
Asia. Therefore, at this point we rather have the prelude to the gradual withdrawal of 
the Turk influence from the areas to the north of the Black Sea and the development 
of autonomous Byzantine contacts with the nomadic steppe nations, subordinate to 
the Türks, who dwelt in the aforementioned territory326. As it would be seen in the 
next chapters from these people, the Khazars evolved into the most important allies 
of Byzantium. 
2.8. The letter of the Türk khagan to emperor Maurice. 
(According to Theophylactus Simocatta) 
 
Despite the fact that the Western Türks did not evacuate the territories of the 
northern Black Sea until 590327, the relations between the two nations were improved 
since the Türks restricted Avar aggressiveness towards Byzantium and the Byzantines 
carried on their struggle against the Persians. Apart from a possible exchange of 
embassies (579 and 584) that concerned the Avars, who were their mutual enemy, it 
is of particular interest the letter that was sent by an anonymous khagan to the 
Byzantine emperor Maurice to declare his triumphs over his enemies via his 
ambassadors328.  
Unfortunately, Theophylactus Simocatta, who is the main source for this letter 
did not provide any information on the name of the khagan, the date of the letter 
mission or even its precise content. He interrupts his military narrative in the summer 
of 595329 to make an important digression recapitulating the history of the Türk 
                                                          
326 Κορδώσης 2012, 146-147. 
327 Grousset 1970, 130. 
328 Theophylactus Simocatta, VII.6.7, 256-257: “Θέρους ἐνεστῶτος κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ὁ πρὸς 
τῇ ἕῳ ὑπὸ τῶν Τούρκων Χαγάνος ὑμνούμενος πρέσβεις ἐξέπεμψε Μαυρικίῳ τῷ αὐτοκράτορι, 
ἐπιστολήν τε συντεταχὼς ἐπινίκια ἐνεχάραττεν ἐν αὐτῇ”. 
329 Vaissière 2015, 91; Whitby- Whitby 1986, n. 32, 188; “…however, from the contents of the Chagan's 
letter, it can be calculated that the embassy must have been dispatched at the very start of Maurice's 
reign”. Cf n. 43: “References in Chinese sources to the history of the Turks indicate that the revolt was 
defeated in c. 582, which provides the terminus post quem for the dispatch of the embassy”. 
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expansion to the west in the mid-6th century. Thus, he only preserves the letter’s 
salutation, word for word as follows: Ἡ δὲ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἐπιγραφὴ εἶχεν ἐπὶ λέξεως 
οὕτως ‘τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ὁ Χαγάνος ὁ μέγας δεσπότης ἑπτὰ γενεῶν καὶ κύριος 
κλιμάτων τῆς οἰκουμένης ἑπτά330. It seems that the letter was written in the Sogdian 
language which was considered as the lingua franca of Central Asia at that particular 
era331. 
Due to the limited information there are certain disputed issues deriving from 
the letter. One of the most controversial issues is the name of the anonymous khagan 
who sent the letter332. According to the Türk titulature, the great lord of seven races 
and master of seven zones of the world had to be the supreme leader of the Türks. The 
expression master of the seven zones of the world is found in many Arab writers 
designating the entire inhabited earth333 and it is also confirmed by the Bugut 
inscription334 . However the great lord of the seven races is not mentioned in Bugut. 
On this topic Vaissière claims that the consequential link γὰρ in the following sentence 
“τῷ ὄντι γὰρ τὸν ἐθνάρχην τῶν Ἀβδελῶν (φημὶ δὴ τῶν λεγομένων Ἐφθαλιτῶν) 
καταπολεμήσας οὗτος αὐτὸς ὁ Χαγάνος ἐνίκησε τήν τοῦ ἔθνους ἀρχὴν περιεβάλετο” 
illustrates that the Türk khagan acquired these titles since he defeated the 
Hephthalites335.  
Then, Theophylactus mentions the victorious wars that οὗτος αὐτὸς ὁ Χαγάνος 
waged against the nation of Abdeli whom he identifies with the Hepthalites, and the 
Avars336. It is worth noting that the historian uses the verbs περιεβάλετο and 
                                                          
330 Theophylactus Simocatta, VII.6.7, 257. 
331 Kljaštornyj-Livšic 1972, 70-71; Κορδώσης 2012,n. 46, 164; Vaissière 2010, 221. 
332 While there is no consensus on the name of the khagan many scholars believe (Chavannes 1900, 
249; Κορδώσης 2012, 165) that the anonymous khagan could be identified with Tardu, who emerged 
as the most powerful figure of his empire after the Türk civil war. cf Vaissière (2015, 91-101 and 2010, 
219-224) who makes a new hypothesis. Through the re-dating of the letter mission from 598 to 595 
and on the basis of the Sogdian inscription called that of Mongolküre, he claims that that the 
correspondent of Maurice was not Tardu, but rather the kagan Niri, who proclaimed himself supreme 
khagan in the same year 595 and reigned over the northern Tianshan. 
333 Chavannes 1900, 249. 
334 Vaissière 2015, 93. 
335 Vaissière 2015, 93: “The consequential link γὰρ is here important. The Turkish Qaghan has these 
titles because he defeated the Hephtalites. It seems that Theophylact understood the name of the 
Hephtalites as based on Iranian Haft, seven. The question is: is he right in doing so or is this a learned 
but false gloss?”  
336 Theophylactus Simocatta, VII.6.7, 257: “τῷ ὄντι γὰρ τὸν ἐθνάρχην τῶν Ἀβδελῶν (φημὶ δὴ τῶν 
λεγομένων Ἐφθαλιτῶν) καταπολεμήσας οὗτος αὐτὸς ὁ Χαγάνος ἐνίκησε τήν τοῦ ἔθνους ἀρχὴν 
περιεβάλετο. ἐπὶ τῇ νίκη τοίνυν εἰς μέγα ἀρθεὶς καὶ τὸν Στεμβισχάγαν σύμμαχον ποιησάμενος τὸ τῶν 
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καταδουλώσατο respectively in order to describe the type of relations that were 
developed after the subjugation of the two nations to the Türks. This probably means 
that while the rule of the Hephthalites was assumed by the khagan, the Avars were 
enslaved due to the fact that they inhabited his territories337. Only few of them 
managed to escape to the land of Taugast and the land of Mucri338. Theophylactus 
continues his narrative by recounting other enterprises of the Türk khagan as the latter 
subdued all the Ogur nations and prevailed after the civil war339. Consequently, the 
khagan declared these triumphs to the emperor Maurice through the Türk embassy340. 
At this point it is worth mentioning that the reference of Simocatta to the wars 
that the particular Khagan waged against the Hephthalites and the Avars constitutes 
a non sequitur since these wars had taken place, when the Türks headed by the 
Khagan Ishtemi. Chavannes attributes this misconception to the Byzantine translators, 
who were inaccurate in the translation of the letter341. Moreover, he considers the 
                                                          
Ἀβάρων ἔθνος καταδουλώσατο.” Whitby- Whitby 1986, n. 35, 188: “Theophylact was unaware of the 
real chronology of this account of Turkish victories, and this ignorance gave rise to his misguided 
speculations about the Pseudo-Avars. Menander, fr. 10 indicates that some Avars at least had fled from 
the expanding power of the Turks before the Turkish conquest of the Hephthalites in 558; the first Avar 
contacts with the Romans were in 558/9 (Menander, fr. 4). The conquests recorded in the Turkish letter 
may not be placed in chronological order, but in a geographical sequence…” See also Vaissière 2015, 
94: It is quite possible that Theophylact put the conquest of the Hephtalites before that of the Avars 
because of a misleading phrase in Menander the Guardsman: “‘... When I have ended the war with the 
Ephtalites, I shall attack the Avars”. 
337 Κορδώσης 2012, 165. 
338 Theophylactus Simocatta, VII. 257-258. 
339 Theophylactus make a reference to the Var and Chunni, who usurped the name of the real Avars in 
order to provoke fear and panic among the other steppe nations. According to Whitby- Whitby (1986, 
n. 39, 189) the story of Varchonitae appellation is invented by Theophylactus. Moreover, he describes 
vividly the slaughter of the Kolch nation which were “probably the Khalkh nation” (see Whitby-Whitby 
1986, n. 42, 190) as the fallen corpses of this tribe extended for four days journey. Then, Theophylactus 
mentions that the Türks clashed in civil war. A certain man named Turum who was a relative of the 
khagan revolted against his rule. The pretender to the throne collecting great forces managed to win 
the battle. Therefore, the khagan requested the help of three other great khagans whose names were 
Sparzeugun, Kunaxolan, and Tuldich (for the khagans see Chavannes 1900, 14; Κορδώσης 2012, 169-
170, Golden 2003a, 56. Vaissière 2015, 101). The rival forces clashed at the Ikar where there were large 
fields. The usurper’s army was decimated by the united forces of the four khagans. After the slaughter, 
the khagan became again the master of his country. 
340 Theophylactus Simocatta, 7. 8-11, 259; Κορδώσης 2012, 164. 
341 Kordoses (2012, 166-167) excludes the possibility of a bad translation since the Byzantine court had 
experienced and highly qualified translator.cf Vaissière 2015, 95: “At one point, the mention of 
successive qaghans was lost in translation, so that everything was attributed to a single qaghan, 
contemporary of Maurice” 
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reference to the glorious victories of Isthemi justifiable due to the fact that the latter 
was the father of Tardu whom he identifies with the author of the letter342.  
This problem may be resolved if one takes into account that Theophylactus 
preserves only the letter’s salutation word for word. Thus, what the historian wrote 
was not a precise textual reproduction of the letter, since he was probable quoting his 
main source from memory343. Moreover, it is not certain if Simocatta used information 
obtained only from the letter. It is also possible that he might have included 
information – especially as far as Ishtemi was concerned – from the Byzantine 
embassies that were dispatched to the Türks344. Consequently, since all the events 
recounted by Theophylactus could not have taken place under the same khagan, who 
was Maurice’s contemporary, it seems possible that the letter describes the history of 
the Türk empire’s initial expansion from the 550’s to the 590’s345. In addition Kordoses 
believes that the phrase οὗτος αὐτὸς ὁ Χαγάνος, refers to the title of the Türk khagan 
in general which is equivalent with the phrases the king or the emperor. So, there is a 
general reference to all Türk khagans and a presentation of the most important 
historical events from the beginning of the empire that contributed to its expansion346.  
Thus, it is possible that the letter’s reference to the previous triumphs of the 
Türks over the nations of Central Asia aimed at highlighting the victories of the Khagan 
due to which he established his supremacy over the Türks. Accordingly, since he 
became the undisputed leader of his country after concluding the civil war, he 
composed this letter in order to inform the Byzantines of his recent victories against 
his adversaries.  
The most powerful figure that was emerged after the civil war was Tardu347. It 
seems that Tardu sent the embassy to the Byzantines in 598, when the civil war 
between the Eastern and the Western Türks was coming to an end and he became the 
leader of the united Türk khaganate (uniting its eastern and western wings)348. Tardu 
                                                          
342 Chavannes 1900, 249.  
343 Κορδώσης 2012, 167; Macartney 1944, 269-270. 
344 Κορδώσης 2012, 168. 
345 Vaissière 2015, 95. 
346 Κορδώσης 2012, 167-168. 
347 Christian 1998, 258; Chavannes 1900, 249; Κορδώσης 2012, 165. 
348 The chronology of the embassy mission has been a disputed matter. Chavannes (1900, 245, 249); 
Golden (1992, 108-109), Macartney (1944, 268), Zhang Xu-Shan (1996-1997, 220), Κορδώσης (2012, 
169) believes that the embassy was dispatched by Tardu in 598. 
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was at the forefront of the Türk history until 603, when he was obliged to leave his 
country after the great revolution of the ten tribes349. Also, it is probable that his 
opponent, Turum might be identified with the Khagan of the eastern Türks, Doulan350 
with whom Tardu came in conflict between the years 592 and 597351. After a short 
period of cooperation between the two khagans, Doulan was killed by his men and 
Tardu declared himself as the master of seven zones of the world namely he became 
– or at least he though he became – the lord of the western and eastern Türks352. 
Nevertheless, there is no certainty concerning the identification of khagan. It 
is also possible that the particular Khagan might be the leader of the eastern Türks 
since according to Theophylactus, he cooperated with Ishtemi to defeat the Avars353. 
If it is taken into account that the khagan of the eastern Türks, Ranquian had a long-
term cooperation with China and the treaties that were concluded with China after 
the civil war aimed at maintaining tranquility at the land of the Türks by preventing 
imminent uprisings, then Ranquian could be identified with the Khagan who 
dispatched the embassy to the Byzantines354. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulty in the identification of the khagan, the 
dispatch of the Türk embassy during the reign of Maurice indicates that the relations 
between the Türks and the Byzantines were not tensed. Actually, they had been 
improved before the withdrawal of the Türk forces from Crimea, when the Byzantines 
took advantage of the Türk presence at the particular territory in order to intimidate 
the Avars (584). In addition, the Byzantines, complying with the Byzantine- Türk treaty, 
were fighting against their mutual enemies. They succeeded not only to defeat the 
Persians repeatedly but also to wage wars against the Avars at the northern frontier. 
                                                          
349 Κορδώσης 2012, 165. 
350 Vaissière (2015, 100) also believes that Dōulán was regarded by the Chinese sources as the legitimate 
heir of the throne rebelled against the great Khagan.  
351 Κορδώσης 2012, 171. 
352 Κορδώσης 2012, 171. 
352 Κορδώσης 2012, 171. 
353 Theophylactus Simocatta, VII. 7.9, 257. 
354 Κορδώσης 2012, 171-172 ; Whitby- Whitby 1986, n. 32 188 ; Vaissière 2015, 92 ; Vaissière (2010, 
221-224) claims that the khagan who was Maurice’s correspondent, was not Tardu but rather the 
khagan Niri -on the basis of the Sogdian inscription called Mongolküre- who proclaimed himself 
supreme khagan l’année du lièvre. According to that particular dating system Vaissière re-dates the 
letter of the Khagan from 598 to 595 when the military narrative by Theophylactus had reached the 
summer of 595 considering the particular date as the year of Niri’s accession to the throne. 
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Consequently, it was the right time for the Türk khagan to send the letter to his allies, 
whose prestige was strengthened after the successive victories, in order to 
communicate his triumphs against his adversaries 
 
2.9. Brief note on the origins and the appearance of the Khazars in the 
Eurasian steppes 
When the Western Türks arrived in the Volga River region, the Khazars were 
under the jurisdiction of the Western Türks355. Since the Türk khanate receded back 
into the steppes of Central Asia356, because it had suffered great loses due to the civil 
war 582-603357, other Turkic (mostly of Ogur stock)358 states arose out of the ashes of 
the western Türks from whom they received their administrative system, titulature 
and even their royal elites359. The Khazar khanate must have been formed as an 
independent polity in the mid seventh century together with the emergence of the 
Onogurs’ state360. During that period the Khazars consolidated their power at the 
region between the Volga and the fortress city of Derbent. However, very soon 
warfare broke out between the newly formed polities for the dominion in the Pontic 
steppes until the dissolution of the of Magna Bulgaria in the 670s361. The Khazars 
became the dominant power in the region having displaced the Bulgars, a number of 
which ruled by Baian- the oldest of Kubrat’s five sons -stayed at the lands of the 
previously Old Great Bulgaria and paid tribute to the Khazars. Ever since their land 
became part of the Khazar state.   
                                                          
355 Brook 2006, 11; Dunlop 1954, 327. 
356 Κορδώσης 2012, 147: “Ιn the recent years some scholars believe that the ruler of the Onogur Bulgars 
did not rebelled against the Avars driving them out of his land,s as (the Patriarch) Nikephoros (22, 70) 
mentions, but against the western Türks”. For further information and bibliographical references see 
Καρδαράς 2010, 152 -155. 
357 Christian 1998, 284; Golden 1980, 37. 
358 Golden 2003b, 49: “The Türks also organized the various Sabir, Ogur and other Turkic elements in 
the Western Eurasian steppes into a powerful confederation under the direct authority of the Yabgu 
Qagan. The latter was a member of the royal Ashina clan and the ruler of the western part of the Türk 
realm. In the course of the seventh century, two major tribal unions emerged in this region under the 
Türk banner: the Khazars (Q’ azar) and Bulgars”.  
359 Golden 1980, 37: “the Ashina gave the Khazars their dynasty, the Tu-lu/Dulo, which also may have 
been a Hiung-nu royal clan, gave the Bulgars their royal family”. 
360 Christian 1998, 284; Golden 1980, 51, 1990b 264; 1992, 233; Golden 2003b, 50: “The period 630-
640 marks the full emergence of the Khazar and Onogur/Onogundur-Bulgar confederations…” 
361 Golden 1990b 264-265, 1992, 233, 1980, 51. 
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 The earliest reference to the Khazars dates from the year 555 in the 
Syriac Chronicle of Zachariach of Mitylene362, in which the Khazars were listed among 
the nomadic tribes living in tents north of Caucasus Mountain. Theophanis Confessor 
believes that they were originated ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνδοτέρου βάθους Βερζιλίας τῆς πρώτης 
Σαρματίας καὶ ἐδέσποσε πάσης τῆς περατικῆς γῆς μέχρι τῆς Ποντικῆς θαλάσσης363. 
The same historian calls them either Khazars orTürks364 as he apparently incorporates 
them into the wider Türk family365, while Nikephoros the Patriarch of Constantinople 
refers to them as Türks. Unfortunately, due to the lack of written sources and other 
evidence, their appearance as an entity cannot be delineated precisely, since in the 
early stages of their history the Khazars were subjugated to the Türks. Therefore, it is 
not easy to disentangle the Khazars from the Türks until the seventh century given 
that these ethnonyms were used interchangeably in many sources366. In addition, the 
distinction between the two nations is even harder to be made because the ethnonym 
of the Khazars was attributed to various steppe tribes in the early sixth century367. 
Also, the references to the Khazars in the Arabic accounts of the seventh century are 
of dubious historical value due to the fact that these accounts were transmitted orally 
for over a century before being first put in writing368.      
 There have been a number of theories concerning Khazar origins but the issue 
is far from being resolved369. Thus, the Khazars may be identified with the Akatzirs, or 
a group of Hephthalites lived near Xurâsân which migrated westward to Caucasus in 
the late 5th - early 6th century and probably joined with the Sabirs and others. They 
                                                          
362 Zachariach of Mitylene, XII.7, 328.: “the Unnogur, a people living in tents, the Ogor, the Sabir, the 
Bulgarian,* the Khorthrigor, the Avar, the Khasar, the Dirmar (?), the Sarurgur (?), the Bagarsik (?), the 
Khulas (?), the Abdel, the Ephthalite, these thirteen peoples dwelling in tents;” 
363 Theophanes Confessor, 358. 
364 Theophanes Confessor, 315: “καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ διατρίβων τοὺς Τούρκους ἐκ τῆς ἑῴας, οὓς Χάζαρεις 
ὀνομάζουσιν,”, 316: “οἱ δὲ Χάζαρεις διαρρήξαντες τὰς Κασπίας πύλας ἐν Περσίδι εἰσβάλλουσιν εἰς τὴν 
χώραν τοῦ Ἀδραϊγὰν”, 317 “Ἡράκλειος σὺν τοῖς Τούρκοις ἀπροσδοκήτως διὰ τὸν χειμῶνα εἰς ἔκστασιν 
ἐνέβαλε τὸν Χοσρόην τοῦτο μαθόντα.”, 326: “καὶ εἰρήνην ποιῶ μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως Ῥωμαίων καὶ μετὰ 
τῶν Τούρκων, καὶ καλῶς ἔχομεν ζῆσαι.”  
365 Κορδώσης 2012, 186. 
366 Golden 1990b, 263; Cf Κορδώσης 2012 n.1, 183 “However, the Khazars were where known to the 
Chinese since in the dynastic history of the Táng there is a mention that the Northern neighbors of Bosi 
(Persia) and Fulin (Byzantium) are the Türk tribes of Ko-sa. See also Hirth 1885, 56. 
367 Golden 2003b, 49. 
368 Zuckerman 1980, 418. 
369 The theories regarding the origins and the ethnic affiliations of the Khazars are examined by Golden 
1980, 51-57. 
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are also associated with the Huns, the Sabirs who were Oguric people or they could 
be a compound of Oguric people with the Sabirs and other elements with a ruling 
stratum consisting of Western Türks Dunlop suggests an Uygur origin of the Khazars370. 
 Taking into account the available data, the origins of the Khazars cannot be 
clarified with certainty. Anthropologically the Khazars were similar to other Türk 
peoples of the Pontic steppes. Also, the linguistic evidence is so sparse and ambiguous 
that it does not offer a clue to the Khazar origins. Nevertheless, it is presumed that the 
Khazar khanate was a, polyglot state since its people spoke Common and Oguric Turkic 
languages as well as varieties of Iranian, Finnic, Ugric, Slavic and indigenous North 
Caucasian languages371. Consequently, the Khazars could probably be people of Turkic 
stock although there were other ethnic elements such as Ugric and Iranian372. Also it 
is likely that the Khazars either emerged from a sub-grouping of the Sabirs, who used 
to live in the area where the Khazars later settled or a grouping brought in by the 
Türks373. Also it is possible they were an amalgam of tribes, Sabirs, Oghurs, Türk led by 
a Türk charismatic clan, perhaps the Ashina clan. Thus, the name Khazar was first a 
political designation and only secondarily an ethnonym374.  
The khazar khanate in its heyday dominated a vast area extending from the 
Volga-Don steppes to the eastern Crimea and the northern Caucasus. Its eastern 
frontiers were not clearly defined. They might extend into the Khwárazmsháh 
realm375. It is claimed that the nobility of the Khazars converted to Judaism in order to 
maintain their neutrality from the Byzantines and the Arabs who were competing to 
disseminate Orthodoxy or Islam and having them under their control376 . However, the 
Byzantine policy was utterly pragmatic and unaffected by religious prejudices377. The 
Khazars became a constant and valuable ally for the Byzantines not only because they 
helped Heraclius to defeat the Persians but also because they halted the northward 
                                                          
370 Dunlop 1954, 34-35. 
371 Golden 2011, 151. For the Khazar language see Erdal 2007, 75-108. 
372 Christian 1998, 283. 
373 Golden 1992, 236. Στράτος (1966, 549-550) argues that the Khazars were a segment of the Western 
Türks, who settled between the rivers Don and Volga in the middle of the sixth century. 
374 Golden 1990b, 263. 
375 Golden 1990b, 264; Noonan 1992, 498. 
376 Noonan 1999, 502:”Judaism was apparently chosen because it was a religion of the book without 
being the faith of a neighbouring state which had designs on Khazar lands”. 
377 Vachkova 2008, 342. 
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advent of the Arabs in the ensuing years378. The Khazar khanate was destroyed by the 
Kievan Rus in the middle of the tenth century. 
 
2.10. Byzantine contacts with the Türks until 626 and its 
final (victorious phase) 
(Military alliance against the Persians, through the Khazars) 
 
Probably, the first contacts with the Khazars were made in 624, when Heraclius 
recruited in his army Colchian, Iberian, and Abasgian allies in order to fight against the 
Persians379. Nevertheless, it seems that the Byzantine-Khazar alliance was officially 
concluded two years later380 in 626, as the Khazars participated in the third phase of 
the Byzantine-Persian war (626-628)381. It is also accepted that in 620s the Khazars led 
attacks raiding Iberia, Albania and the Persian possessions in Armenia with the help of 
the Türk khagan382. The Sassanid king Khosro II warned the Khazars that he would 
destroy them unless they ceased their operations against the Persians, as they finally 
did according to Dasxuranci383. However, Theophanes Confessor gives a different 
account as he claims that the Khazars invaded the land of Adrahigae plundering cities 
of Persia and capturing many prisoners384. 
The Armenian historian Dasxuranci mentions that in 626 the Byzantine 
emperor sent a certain patrician Andrew as his ambassador with promises of immense 
and countless treasure to request help from the Khazars385. Despite the fact that there 
are not sufficient data for the place of the meeting or the content of the negotiations, 
                                                          
378 Christian 1998, 286-287. For the Byzantine-Khazar relations see Noonan 1992, 109-132. Also, Zhang 
1998b, 128: “the Khazars played an important role in supplying Cinese silk to Constantinople until the 
eighth century”. 
379 Bury 1889, 233; Κορδώσης 2012, 198. Zuckerman 2007, 423 “The plan to engage the Turks as allies 
was born during the stay in Transcaucasia”. 
380 Κορδώσης 2012, 198-199; Στράτος (1966, 550) believes that it is not possible to determine with 
accuracy when the Byzantine -Khazar contacts concluded to an alliance. Despite that it is certain that in 
627 of July the Khazars together with the Byzantines participated in joint operations against the 
Persians. 
381 Chavannes 1900, 252; Κορδώσης 2012, 198-199; Ζακυθηνός 1972, 108-111.  
382 Christian 1998, 283. 
383 Movses Dasxuranci, 2.11, 82. 
384 Theophanes Confessor, 316: “οἱ δὲ Χάζαρεις διαρρήξαντες τὰς Κασπίας πύλας ἐν Περσίδι 
εἰσβάλλουσιν εἰς τὴν χώραν τοῦ Ἀδραϊγὰν σὺν τῷ ἑαυτῶν στρατηγῷ Ζιέβηλ, δευτέρῳ ὄντι τοῦ Χαγάνου 
τῇ ἀξίᾳ· καὶ ἐν οἷς ἂν τόποις διέβαινον, τούς τε Πέρσας ᾐχμαλώτευον καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ κώμας τῷ πυρὶ 
παρεδίδουν.” 
385 Movses Dasxuranci, 2.11, 87; Dunlop 1954, 29; Στράτος 1966, 551. 
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Patriarch Nikephoros refers to the same incident. He claims that from the territory of 
Lazica the Emperor sent gifts to the chieftain of the Türk, whom he urged to enter on 
an alliance against the Persians386. The ruler of the Khazars, Djeboukha-khan accepted 
to become an ally of the Byzantines and sent in response a thousand excerpt riders 
through Albania, Georgia and Lazica to the Byzantine capital387.  
Although Djeboukha-khan plays an important role in the Byzantine-khazar 
contacts, his identity or title are much debated since there are different accounts. 
Dasxuranci and Theophanes note that Jebu Xak’an or Ziebel respectively was the 
deputy of the great khagan. More specifically, Dasxuranci mentions that Jebu Xak’an 
was the viceroy of the King of the North and also second to him in kingship. 
Theophanes also explains that Heraclius’ ally, Ziebel was δευτέρῳ ὄντι τοῦ Χαγάνου 
τῇ ἀξίᾳ·. Nikephorus, however, claims388 that Heraclius dispatched presents to the 
master, κύριον of the Türks. .After all, the marriage between Heraclius’ daughter 
Eudokia and the chieftain of the Türks, makes only sense if the latter was the ruler of 
his people389. Consequently, according to the medieval sources, modern scholars 
identify Jebu Xak’an or Ziebel either with the chieftain of the Khazars, who was 
appointed by the Türks as a commander of the westernmost part of their realm390, or 
                                                          
386 Nikephoros, 12, 54- 55. 
387 Movses Dasxuranci 1961, 87; Chavannes 1900, 253; Στράτος 1966, 551. 
388 Nikephoros 12, 54-55: “ἐντεῦθεν ἀποστέλλει δῶρα πρὸς τὸν Τούρκων κύριον, ἐπὶ συμμαχίᾳ τῇ κατὰ 
Περσῶν συγκαλούμενος”.· 
389 Zuckerman 2007, 412. 
390 Chavannes (1900, 255-256) believes that Djeboukha-khan of Dasxuranci is the same person with 
Djibgha ou, Djibghou of the Georgian Chronicles, Ziebel of Theophanes and Djepetoukh of Sébéos. 
Although he makes the hypothesis (1900, 228) that Ziebel was a yabghou due to the fact that all the 
aforementioned proper nouns derived from the personal name of the ruler and the title of jabghou -
according to the language used-, he does not identify him with T’ong jabgou and he claims that Ziebel 
or Djeboukha-khan was the leader of the Khazars, as the narration of Theophanes and Dasxuranci 
confirms. Sinor (1990, 308-309) believes that since the mighty T’ong yabghou would never rank himself 
behind the khagan of the eastern Türks due their internal strife or he would never bow before Heraclius, 
Ziebel cannot be identified with T’ong yabghou. Moreover, Κορδώσης (2012, 210-211) claims that it is 
almost impossible that T’ong yabghou went to Caucasus in person while he was trying to consolidate 
his power over Bactria and the Persian borders. Also, it was a common practice for the western Türks 
to have someone in charge of the western part of their territory despite the fact that the decisions were 
made only by the Khagan. Turxanthus, for instance, who was the chief of the military operations in 
Crimea he was given orders by the khagan of the western Türks, Tardu. Consequently, Ziebel may have 
been a deputy of the western khagan in the region of the Khazars or more specifically the Türk governor 
of the Khazars since the latter were subjected to the Türks until 650. Thus, the Byzantines and the Türks 
communicated with each other through the Khazars in order to destroy the Persians who were their 
common enemy. 
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with T’ong jabgou, the khagan of the western Türks391. However, what is primarily 
important here is the continuation of the Byzantine- Türk alliance since both allies 
decided to co-operate in order to place their common enemy in the crossfire. Thus, 
regardless of whether Ziebel was the chieftain of the Khazars, or the Türks’ deputy or 
the khagan T’ong jabgou, the Khazars were following the orders from the western 
Türks, seeing that they were under the Türk control. 
After the conclusion of the Byzantine –khazar alliance, the Khazars participated 
in the Byzantine counter-attack against the Persian Empire. In 627, according to 
Dasxuranci, the king of the North dispatched the promised army, appointing his 
nephew Chath (the son of Djeboukha-khan) as its leader392. Sébéos mentions that the 
Armenians were under the leadership of Cepetux of China due to the fact that after 
their revolution against the Persians they served the grand khagan of the North 
regions393. Chavannes claims that Chath was the Türk title of şad394 while Stratos 
identifies Cepeteux of Sébéos with Chath of Dasxuranci since in many cases Central 
Asian peoples are mentioned as Chinese395.  
Therefore, in the spring of 627, the Khazars headed by Chath and helped by 
the Armenians raided all the regions of Albania and a part of Atrapatacan396. More 
specifically, after traversing the region of Caucasus, they approached at the Caspian 
Gates where they conquered the stronghold of Derbent, which was the only gate to 
                                                          
391 Stratos (1966, 556) believes that Jebu or khagan Jabgu of Moses is the title of the ruler of the 
Western Türks and not the name of the Khazar leader. Since Ziebel of Theophanes was second in rank 
after the khagan, he should have ruled the western Türks having the inferior title of yabghou, while the 
supreme ruler of all the Türks was the King of the North. Therefore, he identifies Ziebel as T’ong 
yabghou. Bombaci (1970, 7-24) defends the aforementioned identification arguing that there is no 
reason to attribute to Djeboukha-khan any Khazar connection since Khosro II calls him brother due to 
the fact that the Türk and Persian royal families were connected through the marriage between the 
daughter of Khosro I and Ishtemi. Moreover, taking into consideration the distinction that Dasxuranci 
makes between the King of the North and the viceroy Jebu Xak’an as well as the corresponding one 
made by Theophanes according to which Ziebel was second in rank he identifies Ziebel or Jebu Xak’an 
with T’ong yabghou and the King of the North of Dasxuranci or le roi des régions du Nord of Sébéos with 
the ruler of the eastern or northern Türks, Hsieh-li Khagan. 
392 Movses Dasxuranci 1961, 88. 
393 Sébéos, XIX, 52. 
394 Chavannes 1900, 254. 
395 Στράτος 1966, 554; Κορδώσης 2012, 200; Κραλίδης 2003, n. 71, 80; See also Golden 1980, 206: “The 
title şad was widely repanded in the early Medieval Turkic world. Amongst the Khazars, up to the ninth 
century, its bearer is everywhere mentioned as the second in power after the khagan. In Movses 
Dasxuranc’I the şad appears as the nephew of Jebu Xak’ an (Jabgu Qagan) the ruler of the West Kök 
Türks and the Khazars”. 
396 Movses Dasxuranci, 2.12, 88; Chavannes 1900, 254. 
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the fertile land to Aghavanie (modern Azerbaijan). Then, the Khazars invaded and 
plundered thoroughly the land of Aghavanie397 in order to be given to Heraclius the 
required time to be prepared for the decisive campaign against the Persians398. In June 
627 Ziebel having under his command Türk and Khazar troops invaded Albania, and 
joined his forces with Chath. The joined forces of the Khazars besieged and conquered 
the capital of Albania, Partav, in which the Aghvanian forces had withdrawn after the 
fall of Derbent399.  
In the meantime Heraclius proceeded from Lazica to Iberia, where he allied 
with minor rulers of the area except for Stephan, who was a tributary to Khosro II. In 
the summer of 627 the Byzantine emperor met the chief of the Khazars, Ziebel under 
the walls of the besieged capital of Iberia, Tbilisi400. The meeting between Heraclius 
and Ziebel is described by NIkephoros and Theophanes who claimed that Ziebel and 
his host bowed before the byzantine emperor401. It is probable that the almost 
theatrical encounter of the besiegers aimed at undermining the morale of the 
defenders. Moreover, Theophanes adds that Ziebel, who had with him his teen son, 
embraced Heraclius’ neck402. Nikephoros also mentions that Heraclius called the Türk 
khagan his own son and crowned him with his own diadem403. During the ensuing feast 
the Türk lords received ample gifts in the shape of earrings and clothes. The Byzantine 
                                                          
397 Theophanes, 316. 
398 Κραλίδης 2003, 80.  
399Κορδώσης, 2012, 204; Κραλίδης 2003, 80. 
400 Chavannes 1900, 254; Στράτος 1966, 557. 
401 Theophanes Confessor, 316: ““ὁ δὲ Ζιέβηλ τοῦτον ἰδὼν καὶ προσδραμὼν κατασπάζεται αὐτοῦ τὸν 
τράχηλον καὶ προσεκύνησεν αὐτόν, ὁρώντων τῶν Περσῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως τοῦ Τιφίλιος πᾶς δὲ ὁ λαὸς 
τῶν Τούρκων εἰς γῆν πεσόντες πρηνεῖς, ἐκταθέντες ἐπὶ στόμα τὸν βασιλέα ἐτίμων τιμὴν τὴν παρ' 
ἔθνεσι ξένην. ὁμοίως καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες αὐτῶν ἐπὶ πετρῶν ἀναβάντες τῷ αὐτῷ σχήματι ἔπεσον.” See also 
Nikephoros, 12, 54-55:“ἐν τούτῳ ἡσθεὶς Ἡράκλειος ὥρμησε καὶ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτόν, κἀκεῖνος τὴν τοῦ 
βασιλέως παρουσίαν ἀκηκοὼς σὺν πλήθει Τούρκων πολλῷ τῷ βασιλεῖ ὑπηντίαζε, καὶ ἀποβὰς τοῦ 
ἵππου τῷ βασιλεῖ κατὰ γῆς προσκυνεῖ. ἐποίει δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ σὺν αὐτῷ πᾶς ὄχλος.” 
402 Theophanes Confessor, 316: “προσήνεγκε δὲ ὁ Ζιέβηλ καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ υἱὸν ἀρχιγένειον τῷ βασιλεῖ, 
ἡδυνόμενος τοῖς τούτου λόγοις καὶ ἐκπληττόμενος τήν τε θέαν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν αὐτοῦ”. 
403Μωϋσίδου (1995, 278-281) analyzes the importance and the political dimensions of Ziebel’s 
invocation as son of the emperor and his coronation. Very briefly she claims that the invocation of the 
khazar Ziebel as the emperor’s τέκνον ἴδιον does not have any further political meaning, otherwise its 
consequences would be detected in Nikephoros or in later sources as the khazar khanate from this early 
stage would have integrated into the Byzantine commonwealth. Thus, Ziebel accepted the particular 
title because the act of veneration confirmed his friendship with the emperor. She concludes that: “The 
lord who receives from the hand of the emperor the crown and the invocation son would in this case 
be - or even become - more than a barbarian ally .The specific case of spiritual affinity which would 
justify the title of son does not exist here since Khazars are of a different religion" 
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emperor, for fear of suffering the same fate as with the Avar chief, promised his 
daughter Eudocia (or Epiphania) to be given in marriage to the Türk chief404 in order 
to make the agreement more binding405. The promise on the part of Heraclius to marry 
his only daughter406 with the Türk leader indicates the high value set by the Byzantine 
Court on the Khazar alliance407. 
The meeting ended with the conclusion of the alliance between the two 
leaders and the siege of Tbilisi408, which was a disputed area between Byzantium and 
Persia409. Despite the common efforts the besiegers failed to capture the city. 
According to Dasxuranci when the defenders realized that their enemies were 
exhausted and left, they began to parody the defeat. They painted caricatures of the 
emperor and Jebu Xak’an on huge pumpkins which they speared to pieces410. While 
the same writer narrates that the following year the Khazars came back and stormed 
the city successfully, other sources claim that the Khazars continued the siege of Tbilisi 
until its fall. During the siege the Khazars were helped by Ardanases, who was in 
charge of the byzantine forces.411 Nevertheless, one way or another, it is certain that 
Tbilisi was captured in the spring 628412. Although the inhabitants surrendered 
without further resistance they were ferociously massacred413.  
                                                          
404 Στράτος (1966, 560) believes that Heraclius must have promised his daughter to the son of Ziebel 
since the latter was too old to marry Eudocia.  
405 Nikephoros, 12, 56-57. “ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τιμῆς θεασάμενος ἐδήλου αὐτῷ ὡς εἰ τὰ  
τῆς φιλίας αὐτῷ βέβαια εἴη, καὶ ἐποχούμενον πλησιάζειν, καὶ ἅμα τέκνον ἴδιον ἀποκαλῶν. οὕτως οὖν 
οὗτος ἀσπάζεται τῷ βασιλεῖ. ὁ δὲ ὃν περιέκειτο στέφανον τῆς κεφαλῆς λαβὼν τῇ τοῦ Τούρκου κεφαλῇ 
περιέθετο, συμποσιάσας τε αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ εἰς ὑπηρεσίαν τοῦ συμποσίου σκεύη ἅμα καὶ στολῇ 
βασιλικῇ καὶ ἐνωτίοις ἐκ μαργάρων κεκοσμημένοις δωρεῖται αὐτῷ. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν 
ἄρχοντας τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἐνωτίοις αὐτοχειρίᾳ ἐκόσμει. εἶτα δεδιὼς μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Ἀβάρῳ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου 
πείσεται, ἐπικρατέστερα δ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ τῆς συμβάσεως ἀπεργάζεται, παραδείκνυσιν αὐτῷ τῆς 
θυγατρὸς Εὐδοκίας εἰκόνα”. 
406 Koestler 1976, 8: “However, the marriage came to naught because Ziebel died while Eudocia and 
her suite were on their way to him”. See also Κορδώσης, 2012, 206. 
407 Koestler 1976, 8. 
408 Movses Dasxuranci 12, 85: “After this the floods rose and rushed over the land of Georgia and 
encircled and besieged the luxurious, prosperous, famous, and great commercial city of Tiflis.” 
409 Christian 1998, 283. 
410 Movses Dasxuranci, 11, 86; Chavannes 1900, 254; Κορδώσης 2012, 206; Στράτος 1966, 561.  
411 Heraclius had appointed Ardanases as the commander of Iberia after the death of Stephanus who 
had co-operated with the Persians. See Κορδώσης, 2012, 206; Stratos 1966, 562. 
412 Στράτος 1966, 563. 
413 Movses Dasxuranci, 14, 94-95; Christian 1998, 284: “In the same year the Khazars stormed Tiflis 
successfully, put its inhabitants to the sword, and punished its Persian commanders for the insults they 
had suffered the previous year. The Yabghu Khan had blinded, then tortured them to death, skinned 
them, stuffed their skins with hay, and hung them above the city walls”. 
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In the mid- September 627414, while Ziebel continued the siege, Heraclius set 
out from Tbilisi having left behind a minor part of his forces and Ardanases as a 
commander of Iberia. With the bulk of his army415 and 40,000 Khazars he began his 
expedition against the Persians416. The Byzantine troops advanced at the region of 
Gogovit where they rested and joined with the forces of Heraclius’ brother, 
Theodore417. While the assistance of the Khazars was critical to the accomplishment 
of this expedition, Theophanes makes the surprising statement that the Khazars 
returned home in the view of winter and the constant attacks of the Persians that they 
could not bear418. 
Except for Theophanes’ mentioning there is no other reference to the early 
leaving of the Khazars from the expeditionary force of Heraclius. Nikephoros, Georgius 
Monachus and Leon Grammatikos claim that Heraclius along with the Türks invaded 
Persia and destroyed their cities419. Also, there are contradictory sources on this issue. 
Thus, Sébéos and Ardzrouni ignore the Khazars at this phase of the campaign, while 
Michael Syros, Bar Hebraeus and Al Makine speak of the Khazar participation as far as 
Ctesiphon420. 
 According to Stratos, Theophanes’ chronology of the Khazar, retreat almost at 
the beginning of the expedition, is implausible. The army of Heraclius did not 
encounter either the dire conditions of winter until they bivouacked in the houses of 
Ganzak421 or the Persian assaults. Therefore, taking also into consideration 
                                                          
414 Κορδώσης 2012, 207; Στράτος 1966, 562. 
415 The exact number of expeditionary troops, whom Heraclius commanded was probably 20,000 
among which there were Lazs Abkhazians, and Iberians apart from the Byzantines. See Theophanes 
Confessor, 309, Κορδώσης 2012, 207. Ostrogorsky 1978, 168. 
416 For the possible course that Heraclius took see Kaegi 2003, 158-160, Στράτος 1966, 568-570. 
417 Kaegi 2003, 158; Κορδώσης 2012, 207. 
418 Theophanes Confessor, 317:”οἱ δὲ Τοῦρκοι τόν τε χειμῶνα ὁρῶντες καὶ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἐπιδρομὰς τῶν 
Περσῶν, μὴ ὑποφέροντες συγκοπιᾷν τῷ βασιλεῖ ἤρξαντο κατ' ὀλίγον ὑπορρέειν, καὶ πάντες ἀφέντες 
αὐτὸν ὑπέστρεψαν”. 
419 Nikephoros, 12, 56-57: “εὐθὺς οὖν ἄρχοντα καὶ πλῆθος Τούρκων τῷ βασιλεῖ παραδίδωσι· σὺν 
αὐτοῖς τε εἰς τὴν Περσικὴν εἰσβαλὼν τάς τε πόλεις καθῄρει καὶ τὰ πυρεῖα διέστρεφεν.” Georgius 
Monachus, Vol.II, 670. Στράτος 1966, 573-574; .Κορδώσης 2012, 208. 
420 Στράτου 1966,573-574. 
421 Chonicon Paschale, 732. “εἰ γὰρ συνέβη ἡμᾶς ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ἐμβραδῦναι ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ Ζᾶρα, καὶ 
εἶθ' οὕτω γενέσθαι τὸν χειμῶνα, δαπανῶν τοσούτων μὴ εὑρισκομένων ἐν τοῖς τόποις ἐκείνοις, εἰς 
μεγάλην βλάβην εἶχεν ἐλθεῖν τὰ εὐτυχέστατα ἡμῶν ἐκστρατεύματα. ἐξότε γὰρ ἐκινήσαμεν ἐκ τοῦ 
Σιαρσούρων, τουτέστιν ἀπὸ τῆς κδʹ τοῦ φεβρουαρίου μηνός, μέχρι τῆς λʹ τοῦ μαρτίου μηνὸς οὐκ 
ἐνέδωκεν χιονίζειν. ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐλθόντες ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ Κανζάκων ηὕραμεν δαπάνας πολλὰς 
καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀλόγων, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει τοῦ Κανζάκων ἐμείναμεν, τελείᾳ οὔσῃ καὶ ἐχούσῃ 
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Theophanes’ information that Kavad would make an alliance with the Romans and the 
Türks, he concludes that probably there is a mistake on Theophanes’ account which 
may be detected either at the sources that Theophanes used or at the copy of the 
original text. Consequently, Stratos claims that the Khazars left Heraclius’ army not 
before January 628422.  
The battle of Nineveh, fought in December, was the most decisive engagement 
between Heraclius and Khosro’s troops during which the Persians suffered great 
losses. After the retreat of the Persians, Heraclius seized Dastagerd423, which was 
Khosro’s favorite palace and advanced on Ctesiphon424. Although he could tried to lay 
siege to the Persian capital, he chose to turn back to Atropatene and prevent any 
Persian counter-force from blockading them425. In the meantime Khosro II was 
overthrown by his primogeniture son Kavad Siroes, who executed him with his 
eighteen sons. In little more than a month both parties concluded a treaty and Kavad 
abandoned the conquest of his father. Therefore, the borderline between Persia and 
Byzantium was restore as it had been in 602426. 
The Khazars invaded Iberia after their withdrawal from Heraclius’ army. Their 
presence was consolidated at the Caucasian lands not only due to the collapse of the 
                                                          
περὶ τοὺς τρισχιλίους οἴκους, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πέριξ χωρίοις, ὥστε δυνηθῆναι ἡμᾶς τοσαύτας ἡμέρας ἐν ἑνὶ 
τόπῳ ἐπιποιῆσαι”· 
422 Στράτος 1966, 573-574; Κορδώσης 2012, 208. See also Zuckerman 2007 416: “Theophanes probably 
knew—perhaps from Heraclius’ previous dispatch which is now lost—that the Turks had left with the 
winter snows, but, confused by this very late winter (in March) and by the double stay in Ganzak (at the 
beginning and the end of the campaign of 627/8), he made the Turks “slip away” on eve of the first 
stay, before the normal winter season. This allowed him to construct the victory over Persia as an 
exclusive deed of Heraclius’ Christian troop.” 
423 Theophanes Confessor, 322: “ἐν Δασταγὲρδ ἦν τὰ βασίλεια αὐτοῦ; εὗρον δὲ οἱ λαοὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων 
ἐν τῷ παλατίῳ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ Δασταγὲρδ τριακόσια βάνδα Ῥωμαίων, ἅπερ ἐν διαφόροις χρόνοις ἔλαβον· 
εὗρον δὲ καὶ εἴδη ἀπομείναντα, ἀλόην πολλὴν καὶ ξύλα μεγάλα ἀλόης ἀπὸ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ 
ὀγδοήκοντα λιτρῶν καὶ μέταξιν πολλὴν καὶ πίπερ καὶ χαρβάσια  καμίσια πολλὰ ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον, σάχαρ 
τε καὶ ζιγγίβερ καὶ ἄλλα εἴδη πολλά. τινὲς δὲ καὶ ἄσιμον, καὶ ὁλοσήρικα ἱμάτια, νακοτάπητά τε καὶ 
ταπήτια ἀπὸ βελόνης πλῆθος πολὺ καὶ καλὰ πάνυ, ἅπερ διὰ τὸ βάρος πάντα κατέκαυσαν·” 
424Kaegi 2003, 179;  Treadgold 1997, 298-299; Κορδώσης 2012, 208-209; Στράτου 1966, 621-632; 
425 Zuckerman 2007, 417:”The decisive role of the Turkic allies in the campaign of 627/8 also explains 
why Heraclius, once deprived of their support, attempted no military action against the Persians and 
agreed to a border settlement that wiped all territorial gains made under Mauricius.” See also Kaegi 
2003, 179; Treadgold 1997, 299. 
426 Treadgold 1997, 299: “These terms served the interests of both sides. Kavad had little control over 
Syria and Egypt, which were in hands of Shahrvaraz, and Heracliushad good reason not to humiliate a 
complaisant king by demanding further concessions.” 
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Persian Empire but also through raids in 'Albania427, Iberia and a part of Armenia428. 
These predatory raids halted in 630, when civil war broke out within the state of 
Western Turks429. Nevertheless, the control of these wealth lands enhanced the 
influence and the independence of the Khazars, when the Western Türks were falling 
apart430.   
  
                                                          
427 Christian 1998, 284:“The Khazar invasion of Albania caused terrible famine, in which people were 
forced to eat leather and bark as well as the flesh of death”. See also Movses Dasxuranci 1961, 94-101.  
428 Al-Baladhuri, Kitab Futuh al-Buldan 1916, 305, 309. 
429 Κραλίδης 2003, 106. 
430 Christian 1998, 284. 
64 
 
 
3.1. Brief note on Byzantine Diplomacy431 
Byzantium was at the forefront of history for more than a thousand years. 
Throughout its existence the empire was doomed to wage wars against its invaders 
on more than one fronts at a time. However, against these odds, Byzantium managed 
to survive -as long as it did- not necessarily due to its military supremacy at the 
battlefields but mostly due to the fact that it resorted to diplomacy in order to make 
peace with imminent intruders who used to come at its borderlands through the 
steppe corridor. Thus, Byzantium’s struggle to preserve its boundaries became the 
primary objective of Byzantine diplomacy which Obolensky named as defensive 
imperialism432.  
The defensive policy433 of the Byzantine empire is also stressed by other 
scholars434 who point out that war was considered by the Byzantines as a deadlock 
since the outcome of losing a war was irreversible while an imminent victory did not 
prevent the defeated enemy from plundering the Byzantine frontier regions435. 
Moreover, wars were costly especially for a state whose basic income derived from 
agricultural production, which was vulnerable to man-made and natural disasters436. 
Above all, the Byzantines had realized that they had only limited sources to allocate 
on its northern and eastern fronts for their soldiers were outnumbered while the 
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enemies were inexhaustible437. During the sixth century the Empire was in an awkward 
predicament. On the one hand the Byzantium was almost permanently tied up in the 
eastern frontier in its effort to defend the wealthy provinces of Syria and Egypt from 
the Persians. On the other, the Byzantine foreign policy was striving to establish 
peaceful relations with the northern neighbors in order to avoid waging wars on two 
fronts. Since Byzantium could not succeed in halting the barbarian incursions and 
fighting against Persia simultaneously, it had to rely on others to fight its battles438. 
So, aiming at avoiding warlike confrontations and preserving a balance of power either 
on eastern or northern front, the Byzantines attempted to recruit allies439 
Within this context, Byzantium’s relations with the Türks, which culminated 
into joint military operations against Sassanid Persia in Heraclius’ war, had multiple 
effects not only on Byzantium’s Middle Eastern front but also on that of the Balkans 
and on economy, as well. 
 
3.2 .Repercussions on Economy 
The reasons for the development of the Byzantine-Türk relations were partially 
economic since both allies were interested in silk trade. Indeed, silk was one of the 
most important commodities that the Byzantine Empire was striving to import. The 
silk attires became a medium for the Byzantines to display their high social status while 
the murex dyed purple silks were established as royal insignia440. Silk garments were 
so bound to the Imperial living that they were worn by officers according to their rank 
upon the battlefield or by the clergy during the divine service seeing that it became a 
prime requirement for ecclesiastic ceremonies441. Except for building and 
strengthening the royal and ecclesiastical hierarchies silk was used as a means of 
payment and diplomacy442. It was granted to the foreign courts as a valuable 
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diplomatic gift in order to establish, maintain a political alliance or to stave of 
imminent military attacks443.  
Although Byzantium was the largest consumer of silk, its supply often tended to 
fall below the demand. The Byzantine merchants could not take the risk to transverse 
the whole latitude of Asia in order to purchase silk. The trip to China was far away 
from the Byzantine provinces444 and dangerous due to the weather conditions, the 
difficult terrain, the possible attacks of thieves or the regional wars that would 
jeopardize the success of every mission445. Apart from long and dangerous, the 
journey was also expensive since the middlemen raised the original cost of the 
valuable merchandise and the Persians imposed heavy taxes upon those who crossed 
their territory446. In fact, the Sassanids were not only the main intermediaries of silk 
but also they regulated the quantities or the prices of raw silk or textiles that were 
imported to the Byzantine Empire ,447 since they had under their control the central 
Silk Road448, which according to Cosmas Indicopleustes was the shortest way from the 
silk producing countries  to Byzantium449. Thus, one of the major issues that concerned 
the Byzantine-Persian relations450 was the agreement on the conditions under which 
the purchase of silk would be conducted. The treaty of 562 for instance451 among the 
others designated the customs452 through which the silk could pass, the tariffs or the 
people who carried on trade on behalf of the state for both countries453. Nevertheless, 
the bilateral agreements were frequently violated since silk imports depended solely 
on the Persians’ disposal, who raised the price of silk or interrupted any purchase, 
when the two opponents were at war454. The rise of price in raw silk or textiles caused 
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the Roman economy to bleed since large sums of money were spent for the acquisition 
of this luxury product. Not to mention that the supply of raw materials for the silk 
weaving industry was a serious issue for its survival and development455.  
The Byzantine Empire, therefore, made repeated attempts to bring prices down 
by establishing direct state control over the buying of silk and to avert what today 
could be called “capital outflows”. The Kommerkiarioi were appointed by the state in 
the market towns along the frontiers to supervise the foreign trade. They were the 
only persons in the Empire authorized to buy silk from the foreign merchants or to 
refuse to make any purchase until they succeeded in moderating prices for the state’s 
as well as for their own benefit456. Apart from the Kommerkiarioi the state intervened 
through legislation that forbade citizens to buy silk directly from the barbarians and 
punished them by exile or confiscation of their properties457. In the meantime, the war 
with Persia that broke out in 540 disrupted trade transactions. Thus, Justinian I took 
advantage of silk material shortage and made not only the supply of silk but also silk 
manufacture a state monopoly458 fixing the ceiling price at a low level with the hope 
that he would prevent illegal imports of silk. Nevertheless, his measures resulted in 
the creation of black market and the destruction of private weaving workshops459. The 
textiles workers were obliged either to leave for Persia or in the best case to work in 
the imperial factories460.  
Alongside these measures, Justinian tried to introduce sericulture in the Empire461 
in his effort to reduce the Byzantine dependence on imports from Persia. Although 
imports of raw silk remained significant, Byzantine silk production took its first steps 
and in the following years it developed into a major economic factor462. Moreover, the 
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Byzantines attempted to evade the Persian monopoly by making alliances with people 
who could act as their intermediaries and transfer the valuable material but with no 
sizable success. Zacharias of Mitylene mentions the existence of Byzantine- 
Hephthalite contacts 463 before the exchange of Byzantine-Türk embassies in the last 
third of the sixth century464. Justin I (518-527) taking advantage of the common 
religion established relations with the remote Kingdom of Axsum465. He was involved 
in the conflict that broke out between the Axomites and the Hymarites -located east 
wards of Yemen- by providing the former with the Byzantine commercial fleet that 
stationed in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean466. Then, Justinian aiming at securing the 
direct shipment of silk – and other products – through the sea Silk Road and 
circumventing the intermediation of the Persians concluded an alliance with the 
Kingdom of Axum in order to purchase silk from India (Ceylon)467 and sell it in the 
Roman Empire. The particular alliance would be beneficial for both contracting parties 
since the Axomites would gain much money and the Byzantines would be no longer 
compelled to capital flows to their enemy468. In spite of the Axomites promises it was 
impossible for them to compete the Persians, who would arrive first to the Indian 
harbors and markets, due to the proximity of their county, and buy off the 
merchandise469. However, the Sassanids blockaded the Byzantine access to the sea 
Route after the seizure of Yemen (571), which came as riposte to the exchange of 
Byzantine- Türk embassies470. 
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The Persian monopoly over the silk trade in both the central Silk Road and the sea 
Route urged the Byzantines to think the northern branch of the Silk Route as a possible 
way through which they could acquire the valuable material without the Persian 
mediation471. In the meantime the Türks accumulated great quantities of silk, coming 
from China. In fact from the beginning of the Türk- Chinese contacts (545) the Türks 
imposed disadvantageous trade arrangements for China since the latter was enforced 
to batter silk for the Türk livestock in order to buy peace at its frontier472. As a 
consequence, the Türks became more aggressive in order to develop silk trade and 
gain the control over the central Silk Road473. Allied with the Persians, they 
disintegrated the Hephthalite kingdom and took the possession of Sogdiana. The 
Sogdians acknowledging the suzerainty of the Türks played the role of the counsellors 
as they were experienced in silk traffic474.   
Despite the fact that the Persians and the Sogdians had separated the areas of 
their influence475, the Sogdians attempted to establish themselves in the Persian 
commercial areas. As it was aforementioned, they proposed their overlords to send 
an embassy to the Persians requesting their permission to sell raw silk in their land. 
The Persian refusal was justified due to the fact that Khosro I was determined to 
maintain silk monopoly over his territory since there were a powerful merchant class 
that made profit by supplying the Byzantine markets with this luxurious material. Had 
he accepted the Türko-Sogdian proposal he would have permitted the Türks to sell silk 
directly to the Persian customers476, losing the advantage the Persians had as 
intermediaries. The unsuccessful delegation to the Sassanids compelled the Türks to 
look for another market. Following the Sogdians’ advice they attempted to establish 
relations with Byzantium in order to sell them directly their silk stock. 
The conclusion of a Byzantine-Türk alliance (568) was a unique opportunity for 
both contracting parties in economic terms. On the one hand the Byzantines did not 
have to rely on the Persians who regulated the silk traffic (prices, quantities) at their 
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will. By breaking Persian monopoly on silk imports by means of the Türk silk, the 
Byzantines were able to regulate prices in their markets. On the other hand the Türks 
broke the Persian monopoly of silk trade and managed to find access to the western 
market where they could sell their product. When the Persians realized the meaning 
of this development, they set up an ambush for Zemarchus’ delegation on their way 
to Constantinople, but they failed.  
The Byzantine-Türk alliance gave a fresh impetus to trade along the northern Silk 
Route. Crimea became a commercial center of a great importance since it was the 
western terminus of the northern Silk Road477 . In fact, it is likely that the Türks aiming 
at having under their complete control the northern brunch of the Silk Route occupied 
Crimea (576) and besieged Cherson478. Moreover, the Türks’ vassals, the Sogdians, 
were content as they could expand their businesses westwards and increase their 
income479. Also, new trade centers like Samarkand and commercial communities480 
were developed as a result of the intense economic transactions. However, the 
difficult terrain through the deserts to the north of the Caspian Sea and Volga led the 
Türks to launch a military expedition (569-570) against the Persian part of the former 
Hephathlite kingdom in order to take the possessions of the already existing facilities 
of transport481. 
  
                                                          
477 Κορδώσης 2014, 273. 
478 Κορδώσης 2008, 272-273. 
479 Κορδώσης 2012, 273-274. 
480 Eg. the 106 Türks who dwelt in Constantinople and returned to their homeland with Valentine’s 
delegation. See Κορδώσης 2012, 274; Zhang 1998a, 290.   
481 Harmatta- Litvinsky 1996, 360: “However, the Sasanians did not renounce their claim to eastern Iran 
nor did the Hephthalites abandon their aspirations for independence.” 
71 
 
3.3. Repercussions on the Balkan front 
By 560s more than two hundred years had passed since the last Hunnic 
invasion into Roman lands. The devastation caused by the Huns and their nomadic 
confederation must have remained deeply engraved into the memories of the 
Byzantines and must have been a constant reminder to the administrators of the 
empire of the fragility and porosity of their northern frontiers. A system of checks and 
balances had therefore been developed on the part of the empire, relying mainly on 
diplomacy. The Byzantine diplomats used a wide range of means482 such as briberies, 
valuable gifts, bestowal of titles taken from the hierarchy of the Byzantine court, 
subsidies, development of trade relations, land concessions and the diffusion of 
Christian faith483 in order to induce its northern neighbors and bring them into the 
empire’s orbit. Apart from the abovementioned means, the Byzantines diplomatist 
were excellent at instigating one barbarian tribe against another in order to ward off 
their power and make them impotent to attack the Empire484. The implementation of 
the particular tactic was vital for the Empire seeing that a certain neighboring tribe 
was undertaking to defend the northern borders of Byzantium from other barbarian 
attacks, while the major corps of the Byzantine were occupied with the long-lasting 
wars against Persia. 
Justinian I and his successors could wage a full-scale warfare on the eastern 
frontier on condition that they had first managed to build a favorable balance of power 
in the Ukraine steppes by exploiting the differences between the people who lived 
there485. Thus, Justinian I welcomed the first Avar embassy dispatched to the 
Byzantine court in 558 and urged the tribe to take up arms against the Empire’s 
enemies in exchange for valuable gifts. After the conclusion of the alliance, the Avars 
crushed the Unigurs, the Zali the Sabirs and the Antae486 while Justinian was more 
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preoccupied with the eastern front until the signing of the Byzantine-Persian treaty in 
562487. 
Despite the initial friendly contacts between Constantinople and the Avars, the 
latter gradually became uncontrollable and a great threat for the empire by invading 
its northern borders whenever their demands were not fulfilled. After a short stay to 
the north of Caucasus, the Avars moved to the Lower Danube, probably because they 
were facing Türk menace in their rear488 and settled to the north-east of the river 
(561/562)489 from where they launched attacks against the Byzantine empire490. The 
Avar embassies of 562 and 565491 raised their demands as they requested respectively 
Scythia Minor to be their permanent settlement and an increase in their payments in 
return for their service as the defenders of the Byzantine frontier, basically from the 
Slavs. Although the Avar embassies tried to intimidate the Byzantine emperors, their 
demands were rejected. Especially, Justin II was so determined not to follow Justinian 
I’s policy of buying off the northern barbarians that he haughtily declared to them that 
he would never need an alliance with the Avars492.   
It seems that Justin II turned down the Avar requests because he could not 
count on their help when they would be needed to protect Byzantine interests in the 
Southern Russian steppes since they moved to the Lower Danube493. Moreover, it is 
likely that Justin’s attitude is related to the fact that the Türks of the western wing of 
the Türk khanate had already come in contact with the Byzantines in 563 aiming at 
establishing good relations with the Empire and averting any possible alliance with the 
Avars who were considered to be their runaway subjects494. So, it is probable that 
Justin II took into account the Türk proposal, as according to Theophanes Byzantius, 
he denied the Avars access to the lands of Pannonia495 due to the previous Byzantine-
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Türk agreement496. Thus, the embassy of 563 was a delegation on the part of the Türks 
as they aimed at assessing the possibility of co-operation with Byzantium against the 
Avars497, while the Byzantines, through the particular alliance, were probably seeking 
to recruit the Türks as potential allies, who may rebuild the balance of power at the 
empire’s northern frontier and act as a counterweight to the Avar territorial ambitions 
and greediness. 
The Byzantine-Τürk alliance over the northern front continued, despite their 
short-term degradation which took place in 576. The cause of this development was 
the signing of the treaty (574) between the Byzantines and the Avars. The Byzantines 
(576) sent Valentine to request the Τürks’ help since the Persians invaded Byzantine 
Armenia destroying towns and cities498. Instead of giving the required help the Türks 
accused the Byzantines of being deceitful seeing that they violated the terms of the 
treaty and allow the Varchonitae to settle within the Roman territory. Then, the Türks, 
taking andvantage of the ostensible “violation” of the particular agreement, besieged 
the city of Bosporus aiming actually at capturing the whole Crimea, which was the 
terminus of the northern Silk route. Apparently, Turxantus meant the agreement of 
563 according to which the Byzantines were not supposed to offer refuge to the 
Avars499. Nevertheless, despite Turxantus’ allegations the Byzantines did not succumb 
to the recurrent requests of the Avar embassies until 574, when they were defeated 
by them in the field. Moreover, the Byzantines still honored the Byzantine-Türk 
alliance (568) since they were engaged in a strenuous war against the Persians. 
Consequently, the Byzantines had not violated the terms of any treaty. They were just 
unable to enforce it due to the fact that they had to fight on two fronts.  
As long as the Persian war dragged on, Tiberius was unable to defend the 
Empire from the Slavs and the Avars as he had stripped the Balkans of troops. 
Moreover, his policy of the Avar appeasing seemed to have failed seeing that in 579 
the Avars under the pretext of preparing to launch a campaign against the Slavs, 
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constructed a bridge across the river Sava in order to be used for the siege of Sirmium. 
At this difficult juncture the Byzantines took advantage of the Türk presence in Crimea 
peninsula and tried to intimidate the Avars to postpone the assaults against the Slavs 
by telling them that the Türks might attack them from the north500. In addition, it is 
possible that Tiberius sent a delegation to the Türks (579) to request their help for the 
defense of Sirmium. Nevertheless, in spite of all his efforts, Sirmium fell to the Avars 
in 582.  
The treaty that was concluded after the fall of Sirmium and acknowledged by 
Maurice lasted for two years. The Avars broke the treaty when the emperor rejected 
their demands for an increase in tribute. After capturing the cities of Singidunum, 
Viminacium and Augustae, they ravaged as far as Anchialus from where they fell back 
to Sirmium due to the Türk raids in their territories501. It seems that the Türks were 
instigated by Maurice502, who probably had dispatched an embassy (584) to request 
their help in order to repulse the Avars from the Byzantine territories. Although the 
Türks did not annihilate the Avars as they used to declare503 they withdrew their forces 
after being paid with eight centenaria of gold. Consequently, the capture of the city of 
Bosporus was a short breach in the Byzantine- Türk relations while the Türk 
involvement in the Balkans proved crucial for the survival of the Byzantine empire 
taking into account that the Byzantines were unable to confine the Avar 
aggressiveness.  
As it can be inferred, during the reign of Maurice the relations between the 
Byzantines and the Türks were improved with tangible results on the Balkan Front. 
This is best proven by the epistle sent to emperor Maurice, sometime around 598, by 
the khagan of the Türks, via a Türk delegation. Unfortunately, Theophylactus 
preserved the general title of the epistle celebrating the victory of the khagan over his 
enemies but he doesn’t give any precise information on its contents. We have no more 
information concerning the Balkan front in relation to the Byzantine-Türk alliance but 
it seems that it remained more or less stabilized until the reign of emperor Heraclius 
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to the Byzantine throne in 610. It was during his reign that the two allies, Byzantines 
and Türks decided to finish off the Persians, through an epic war that started in 622 
and it was this development that might stir the Balkan front, too.  
Although Heraclius attempted to conclude peace treaties with the Avars (619 
and 623) 504 in exchange for large sums of money, the latter took advantage of the 
emperor’s absence in the east and laid siege on Constantinople in cooperation with 
the Persians (626). Despite the fact that the details of the Avaro-Persian 
rapprochement were unknown, the two parts had come in consultation to attack 
Constantinople simultaneously505. However, the besiegers failed to conquer 
Constantinople.  
The Avars never regained their power after their defeat before the walls of 
Constantinople. Somewhere around 635 kuvrat, the leader of the Onogur Bulgars 
rebelled against the Avars and overthrown their authority506. So, after 626 the Avars 
Khanate in the Balkans was disintegrated and their power was increasingly limited to 
the Pannonian plains.507  
 
3.3. Political Repercussions on the Middle Eastern front 
 
If the Byzantino-Türk deal of 563 covered Byzantium’s northern front, it was 
the 567 treaty with the Türks that covered its Middle Eastern struggle with the 
Persians. The territorial expansion of Persia and its s growing strength during the reign 
of Khosro (531-579) forced the Byzantines to engage in large-scale diplomatic activity 
intending to form an anti-Persian coalition that would encircle the enemy508. The Türks 
who ended up having common frontiers with the Persians and being their enemies 
after the disintegration of the Hephthalite kingdom in the middle of 560s, might have 
been considered by the Byzantines as potential allies. Indeed, it was the Persians that 
turned the Türks towards the Byzantines, when they received in an unfriendly manner 
the two Türk delegations that they proposed to them a mutual co-operation regarding 
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the silk trade and murdered some of the members of the second one. Four years later 
(end of 567 or beginning of 568) after the disruption of the diplomatic contacts 
between the Türks and the Persians, the Khagan Silzibul dispatched an embassy to 
Justin II aiming at establishing trade relations and political alliance with the Byzantines. 
From the terms of the alliance it becomes obvious that the Türks’ main objectives were 
on the one hand to harm the Persian empire in economic and military terms509 and on 
the other to establish the Byzantine-Türk relations since they had mutual interests.  
From the point of view of the Byzantines the alliance of 567 was a unique 
opportunity to bypass the Persians regarding the silk trade through their competitors 
and to annihilate Persia since both allies would launch attacks on its two fronts. 
Moreover, the emperor’s questions regarding the Türk people or their vassals depict 
the Byzantine interest in the political situation of Central Asia for many of the 
barbarian tribes, who used to live there, came at Byzantium through the steppe 
corridor510. In addition, the Türks might be used by the Byzantines for gathering 
intelligence concerning the people of Central Asia with whom the Persians had 
diplomatic contacts such as the Hephthalites511 in the past. In conclusion, the 
Byzantine- Türk alliance of 567 concerned the political and economic developments in 
Central Asia against the Persians and defined the context upon which the Byzantine-
Türk diplomatic relations were built. At this point it is worth to be added that despite 
the fact that there was no reference to the terms of the agreement of 563 regarding 
the Byzantine refusal to offer refuge to the Avars, the particular issue was always 
concerned the Türk policy as it can be inferred from Turxanthus’s saying. So, the 
particular request either was not included in Menander’s narration or the Türk Khagan 
was pleased with the Byzantine maneuvers towards the Avars. Also, Silzibul might be 
interested only in how to deal with the Persians512, since the latter showed their 
hostile intentions by refusing an imminent coalition with the Türks and by killing some 
members of the Maniakh’s delegation.         
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In response to the Türk embassy, Justin II dispatched to the khagan a byzantine 
delegation headed by Zemarchus considering the promising prospects of a potential 
Byzantine -Türk alliance in economic and political terms. It was during this visit that 
the foundations of the Byzantine- Türk alliance were established as both contracting 
parties reaffirmed their friendship and devotion to each other513. The first sign of the 
alliance was the participation of Zemarchus in a raid that the Türks carried into the 
eastern frontiers of Persia514. Justin, as Menander puts it515, believed that this new 
alliance would destroy the Persians since the latter had to wage war on two fronts in 
order to repulse the joint attacks. So, Justin encouraged by the Türks516-it was 
probably the embassy led by Tagma that convey the message to the Byzantines to 
open a second front in the West517 - demonstrated his commitment to the terms of 
the alliance. On the occasion of the Armenians appeals for the Byzantine protection, 
when they rebelled against the Persian rule, the emperor attacked Persia518. In the 
following years until 575 there was an intense exchange of delegations from both sides 
which indicates that the Byzantine- Türk relations blossomed. 
The pressure exercised by Byzantines and Türks over Persia remained 
constant, if one takes into consideration the information given by Tabari that during 
the years from 588-589 the Türks and the Byzantines exercised enormous pressure on 
Persia519. Moreover, it seems that Sassanids and Türks were at each other’s throat 
occasionally until their final confrontation within the context of Heraclius’ wars. The 
new Tang chronicle reports that at the end of Sui dynasty (2nd decade of the 7 
century) the (jabghou) khagan of the western Türks invaded and destroyed the 
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kingdom of Khosro520. In addition, Theophanes mentions that Kavad Siroes had to sign 
a peace treaty with the Türks when he was crowned king521. It seems from the above 
mentioned information that the Türks had already been engaged in war with the 
Persians and that the Byzantines, under Heraclius, entered the war as their allies, 
serving of course their own interests. 
The participation of the Khazars in Heraclius’ campaign as his allies can only be 
seen under the light of the Byzantine-Türk alliance. The Khazars, being a vassal nation 
to the Türks, stepped in with their 40000 warriors only to help the ally of their master. 
The fact that in 626, the Persians and the Avars laid siege on Constantinople 
simultaneously is an indirect proof that the Byzantine-Türk alliance affected these two 
nations (and consequently two separate regions – the Balkans and the Middle East) 
and for that both the Avars and the Persians were trying to break it, by removing one 
of the two participants in it (Byzantium)522. However, Heraclius reinforced by the 
Khazar army instead of defending the Byzantine territories from the Persian assaults 
brought the war into his enemies’ heartland. The Persian defeat in Nineveh (627) 
accelerated the collapse of the Sassanian empire and exposed the fragility of Khosro 
II’s former achievements523.  
The permanent conflict exhausted the adversaries who became almost 
incapable to defend their states from the new rising power of Islam. Notwithstanding, 
while the Byzantine empire used the Khazars as counterweight to the Arab 
aggressiveness, the Persian empire had nothing to fall back on. The destruction of the 
fertile lands in Mesopotamia caused by the campaigns, the people’s overtaxation, the 
exhaustion of the army and the political instability due to the internal strivesfor the 
succession of the throne524  made the Sassanid empire unable to survive military 
defeat at the hands of the Arabs525. So, in 637 Ctesiphon was occupied by the 
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victorious army of the Arabs and in 642 the Persian forces were thoroughly defeated 
at the battle of Nihavand526. Consequently, the Byzantine- Türk alliance achieved its 
objectives since the Persian empire was anihilated, but the price paid by the 
Byzantines was also high. By the mid of the seventh century, Byzantium’s eastern 
provinces-Syria and Egypt-were incorporated into the Islamic caliphate527.  
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The Türks appeared at the foreground of the History as a mighty power after 
the overthrown of the Róurán yoke Headed by members of the of A-shih-na clan, they 
soon embarked on a series of military campaigns aiming at gaining the control over 
the Silk Road. They disintegrated the Hephthalite empire (ca. 560) through a joint 
action with the Persians and incorporated Sogdiana to their Khanate. After the failure 
to establish commercial footholds in Persia in order to sell their Chinese silk stock, they 
attempted to come in contact with Byzantium, which was the ultimate and most 
important silk consumer. 
To this end, a Türk delegation led by the Sogdian Maniakh (567) was dispatched 
to the Byzantine court and proposed a trade agreement and a political alliance. The 
particular embassy was not the first one arrived at Constantinople since it is likely that 
the delegation of Kermichíōnes (563) was sent under the instructions of the Türk 
yabghou in order to prevent the Byzantines from offering refuge to the Avars. The Türk 
requests of Maniakh’s embassy were granted by Justin II. From the Byzantines’ point 
of view it was a first class οportunity to break the monopoly of silk trade controlled by 
the Persians since the latter regulated the prices and the quantity of the luxurious 
material. The alliance was equally beneficial for the Türks who could sell their product 
directly to the Byzantines bypassing their main competitors, the Persians. Another 
apect of the Byzantine- Türk alliance was the fact that both allies aimed at placing 
Persia in the crossfire seeing that the Byzantine were engaged in the almost 
permanent conflict with the Perians and the Türk were interested in the the 
appropriation of parts of the central Silk Road.  
Justin anxious to secure for Byzantium a potential supplier of raw silk and a 
reliable ally operating in the rear of the Sassanid empire sent a Byzantine delegetion 
headed by Zemarchus in response to the Türk one. İt was during this visit that the 
Byzantine- Türk alliance was established. Zemarchus after his splendid reception he 
was allowed to follow a Türk campaign against the Persians. Apparently, in this way, 
Silzibul demonstrated his commitment to the terms of the alliance regarding his 
attitude towards the common enemy. When the Persians, realized that their eastern 
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and western frontiers were exposed to the allied forces, they tried to balance the 
situation by embarking a campaign in Felix Arabia in order to cut off the Byzantines 
from the sea Silk Route. The Byzantines, in turn, urged by the Türks lanched attacks 
against the Persians (572) aiming at the encirclement of Persia.  
Despite the frequent diplomatic exchanges from 568 to 576 the Byzantine-Türk 
relations became strained as it can be deduced by the hostile reception of Valentine’s 
delegation. The main reason for the Türk discontent was the fact that the Byzantines 
offered refuge to the Avars who were the Türks’ subjects. However, the Byzantines 
honorored the Byzantine-Türk agreement seeing that on the one hand they were 
engaged in a war with the Persians and on the other they did not succumb to the Avar 
pressure for their permanent settlement in the Byzantine lands until the treaty of 574. 
Thus, it seems that the Türks’ objectives changed regarding the bilateral agreement. 
Having under their control the eastern and the central part of the northern Silk Route, 
the Türks probably aimed at conquering Crimea, which was westernmost end of the 
steppe Silk route in order to secure silk traffic at their own benefit. Therefore, they 
used the supposed Byzantine noncompliance with the terms of the alliance as a 
pretext in order to justify the hostile attitude toward their former allies. 
In spite of the strained relations, it is likely that Byzantium sent two delegations 
(during the reign of Tiberius and Maurice) to the Türks in order to request their heip 
to defend the empire’s Balkan frontiers. As it can be inferred from the sources, the 
Türks responded to the Byzantine appeals by attacking the Avars in their rear and 
oblidging them to fall back to Sirmium (584). Therefore, the Byzantine-Türk relations 
were improved before the withdrawal of the Türks from Crimea. The letter of the Türk 
khagan sent to Maurice (598) can be explained in this context. Since Tardu became 
the uncontested leader of the western Türks after the internal strives, he wanted to 
demonstrate his triumphs to his allies, who were launching victorious campains 
against the Persians for the time being. 
Seeing that the Avars withdrew to the Hungarian plains after their failure to 
capture Constantinople (626), the allied forces concentrated on the annihilation of 
Persia. The two allies cooperated to encircle the common enemy as during the last 
years of the Byzantine-Persian wars, the Persians had an open military front with the 
Türks. The Byzantine - Türk alliance was reaffirmed by the participation of the Türks in 
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the last phase of Heraclius’ campaign (626-628) through the Khazars, who were their 
vassals. The Khazars, who were under the western Türks’control, played a vital role in 
Heraclius’ victory over the Persians. The allied forces inflicted a severe blow to the 
Persian empire from which it never recovered. Thus, the objectives of the Byzantine- 
Türk alliance achieved since the Balkans were relieved from the Avar aggressiveness 
and the Persian empire submitted to the new rising power of Islam, exhausted by the 
protracted wars.   
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Map.1:  3rd-6th centuries A.D.: The Sassanids, Kidarites, the Hephthalites and the 
Róurán.  
Reproduced from Bregel 2003, 13. 
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Map 2:  6th- 7th centuries A.D.: The Sassanids and the first Türk Khanate.  
Reproduced from Bregel 2003, 15. 
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Map 3: The Türk Khanates. Reproduced from Golden 1992, 154. 
 
Map 4: The Byzantine empire in the 6th century. Reproduced from Whittow 1996, 39.  
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Map 5: The Sasanian empire in the 6th century. Reproduced from Rubin 2008, 131. 
 
Map 6: The Byzantine- Persian frontiers after the Byzantine gains in Armenia (591). 
Reproduced from Greatrex-Lieu 2002, xxx.  
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Map 7: The Balkans: Invasion routes. Reproduced from Whitby 1988, 170.  
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Map 8: Heraclius’ campaign against Sassanian armies, 624-628. Reproduced from Kaegi 
2003, 1223. 
 
Map 9: The Silk Roads from China to the Roman Orient. Reproduced from Watson 1983, 543.  
 
